In my last blog, ICP International Agreements – Need for Speed?, we explored various ICP characteristics that underpin the DoD ICP International Agreement (IA) process. 

In this blog’s summary, I noted that DoD is responsible for establishing ICP IAs of varying complexity with a broad range of allied/friendly nations and international organizations across the entire acquisition lifecycle to meet the needs of the entire DoD acquisition community by addressing the following macro-level objectives for each new ICP being considered.

While maximizing ICP IA speed of establishment is important, negotiating a proposed ICP that doesn’t achieve any of these objectives makes no sense even if it’s accomplished quickly and efficiently.  Accordingly, it is essential that proposed DoD ICPs achieve most, if not all, of these objectives once the IA is signed and the ICP is implemented.  All proposed ICPs start with an idea, which eventually matures into an ICP concept that must be transformed into an ICP IA to establish and implement it.  Who decides on the merits of a proposed ICP idea?  In the first instance, one or more ICP Advocates within DoD.  Let’s learn more about them.

ICP Advocates – The “Usual Suspects”

Fortunately, we can use the chart above to help us answer this question:

Operational ICP Advocates: 

Within DoD:  Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders (CoCoMs), Service ‘Green or Blue Suit’ staffs.

External:  USG coalition building organizations (e.g., NSC, State Department), NATO Military Committee and Commands, and allied & friendly nations’ operational force commanders.

Economic Burden Sharing and Affordability ICP Advocates: 

Within DoD:  Under SecDefs for Acquisition & Sustainment or Research & Engineering and DoD Component Acquisition Executives, Science and Technology (S&T) organizations, RDT&E organizations, Program Executive Officers (PEOs), Program Managers (PMs) and Logistics Commands.

External: Congress, industry, allied & friendly nations’ defense acquisition organizations.

Political-Military ICP Advocates: 

Within DoD:  Under SecDef for Policy, Joint Staff, CoCoMs, Service ‘Green or Blue Suit’ staffs.

External:  NSC, State Department (Main State & Embassies), NATO SecGen and International Staff, allied & friendly nations’ ministries of foreign affairs.

Technology & Innovation ICP Advocates: 

Within DoD: Under SecDef for Research & Engineering, DoD Component Acquisition Executives and their S&T and RDT&E organizations plus various specialized DoD organizations such as DARPA, DTRA, DIU, CIO, CDAO.

External: Congress, industry, allied & friendly nations’ defense S&T, RDT&E, and innovation organizations

Industrial Base ICP Advocates: 

Within DoD: Under SecDef for Acquisition & Sustainment (including Assistant SecDef for Industrial Base Policy and Director for Defense Pricing, Contracting, and Acquisition Policy) and DoD Component contract policy and industrial base policy organizations.

External: Congress and industry.

DoD Advocacy -- Levels of Influence

On one hand, the DoD organization is very simple.  One person, the Secretary of Defense, is solely in charge while everyone else from Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, other Office of SecDef and DoD Component Head political appointees, Four Stars and below, SESs, O-6s through E1s, and GS-15s to GS-1 in the Department report to him or her (albeit, most of them indirectly).

On the other hand, DoD operates on a daily basis under the SecDef and DepSecDef like a feudal society with a byzantine (i.e., highly complex or intricate and occasionally devious) mix of top ranked military and civilian senior officials with impressive titles, high and middle level middle managers, and actual workers engaged in an unimaginable array of defense acquisition efforts and activities.

Taking the cognitive differences between these two different perspectives on how DoD operates into account – noting that both are both true, in some sense -- here are a key few principles of ICP Advocacy within the Department that I have gleaned from personal experience and observation:

Top-Level Advocacy:

• It’s nice to have friends at the top of “Mount Olympus” – SecDef, DepSecDef, Service Secretaries and Under Secretaries, CJCS, and Service Chiefs – if they have the interest and bandwidth to advocate for ICPs at the DoD enterprise level (or even for a specific ICP) …
• However, interest and bandwidth at the top of Mount Olympus is always in very short supply so Lower-Level ICP Advocates can’t count on Top-Level Advocates being there when really needed, while also keeping in mind that …
• Sometimes Top-Level “help” can do more harm than good.

Intermediate-Level Advocacy:

• It’s more important to have friends somewhere between the top of “Mount Olympus” and the foothills and valleys below -- DoD Component Acquisition Executives, Service Resource Sponsors, one/two star Flag/General officers or SES equivalents in key positions – if they have the passion, willingness, and knowledge to advocate for ICPs within the DoD Component for specific ICPs within their area of responsibility …
• However, these individuals come and go every few years so you must strike while the iron is hot to benefit from their efforts while practicing ‘conservation of enemies’ theory within your DoD Component and major commands to …
• Avoid creating or engaging one/two-star Flag/General officers or SES equivalents in key positions who dislike ICPs in general, or your proposed ICP in particular.

Working-Level Advocacy:

• It’s absolutely essential to have someone down in the foothills and valleys of “Mount Olympus” –  S&T bench scientists, RDT&E technologists, PEO staff, PMs, or Integrated Product Team leads at the O-4/O-6 or civilian equivalent levels – who has the passion, willingness, standing, programmatic/technical knowledge, and bureaucratic acumen to advocate for a proposed ICP at higher levels within DoD coupled with …
• A competent, experienced DoD Component ICP international agreement negotiator who can help them engage and navigate the byzantine aspects of the DoD ICP IA process plus …
• Helping them find and/or engage like-minded allied/friendly nation counterparts who are equally passionate, willing, and able to advocate for the proposed ICP within their national defense structure.

ICP Advocacy Perspectives

You may have noticed that DoD is full of very important people, particularly in the Washington DC arena.  If you don’t believe this, just ask them!  (This is a joke, well sort of …)

When these important people decide to become an ICP Advocate on behalf of a proposed ICP idea or concept, or your DoD organization decides to enlist their support, they encounter an alternative universe where normal Pentagon methods of coercion or persuasion don’t necessarily apply.  All DoD-proposed ICPs require some level of State and Commerce Department involvement during the ICP IA review and approval process. Most require Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) approvals that involve DoD and USG intelligence community organizations.  U.S. industry must obtain State and/or Commerce Department export approvals, based in part on USG/DoD TSFD decisions, prior to engaging in ICP-related contracting activity. Complex ICPs (see my previous blog if you don’t remember what these are) require Congressional notification per 10 USC 2767 (also referred to as Arms Export Control Act Section 27) prior to signature. 

The well-worn Washington arena adage, “where you stand on a matter depends on where you sit” also often rears its head.  Important people in DoD may think a proposed ICP is such a great idea that it should be approved and implemented immediately.  Other DoD or USG organizations, maybe not so much.

Even the SecDef and other important people within DoD are unable to order entities external to DoD to approve the proposed ICP -- or override their objections -- within the largest feudal society of all, the U.S. Government.  The fact is that advocating ICP ideas within the higher levels of DoD and the USG involves a lot more “selling” than “telling.”

This is often a source of great frustration within DoD, but that’s just the way things work in the ICP IA world.  Some important people are better than others at adapting.  All of them have to learn to deal with it. 

Turning ICP Ideas into Viable ICP Concepts

As an ICP concept matures, DoD ICP Advocates (at all levels) -- plus their allied/friendly nation counterparts -- must decide whether it’s worth pursuing.  After all, ICP ideas are not like the children in Lake Woebegon, who are all above average. Only ‘good’ ICP ideas should be pursued. 

The burden of assessing ICP ideas typically falls upon the Working-Level ICP Advocate organization, with occasional ‘cheerleading’ support and bureaucratic ‘nudges’ from higher level DoD Advocates (if they exist).   In most cases, Working-Level ICP Advocate organizations either recommend turning “good ideas” into ICP concepts (smiley face) or, if necessary, killing “bad ideas” (sad face).  This is not a task for the faint of heart.

If the overall DoD Advocacy decision is positive, the Working-Level ICP Advocate organization -- which is typically referred by ICP IA experts as the “ICP Proponent” from this point onward -- must work with key stakeholders in the U.S. and partner nations to define the proposed ICP’s quality measured against Big O and little O objectives as shown in the chart below.

While diverse stakeholders at various levels within DoD may have varying opinions on a proposed ICP’s merits, at the end of the day the ICP Proponent must evaluate the proposed ICP carefully to determine if it will meet a logical set of Big O and little O objectives.  Depending on the outcome of their analysis, the ICP Proponent either: a) seeks formal ICP IA negotiation authority from its DoD Component IPO and/or OUSD/A&S/International Cooperation (IC) Office; or b) recommends stopping work on the ICP idea to DoD higher authorities. That is why ICP Proponents are the first and the most important arbiter of a proposed ICP’s quality.  But are they up to the task?

Ideal ICP Advocacy Scenario

A proposed ICP idea, assessed and validated by an experienced, passionate, and determined ICP Working-Level Proponent team, which plans to enlist the support of one or more Intermediate-Level key officials within their DoD Component to move it forward.  This Proponent is also fortunate enough to have a Top-Level political appointee or four-star at the top of Mount Olympus advocating for this ICP idea as it wends its way through the DoD ICP IA review and approval process. Sometimes it’s helpful to have friends in high places.

The Working-Level ICP Proponent team possesses the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to actively engage in DoD Stakeholder Analysis and Engagement Decision Framework activities at all levels (see chart below) to achieve broad and deep support for the proposed ICP.

ICP Advocacy Nightmare Scenario

A proposed ICP idea, assigned to a Working Level ICP Proponent team with little or no experience in the ICP area, to follow up on a brief discussion at a high-level meeting on Mount Olympus last week.  Unfortunately, the Proponent team:

• Doesn’t know where this ICP idea came from and is unable to find out any further details.
• Works within a DoD Component organization that prefers Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to ICP transactions. 
• Has a DoD Component IPO that is understaffed, overstressed, and under-loved which is unable to help them.
• Will likely encounter a key senior official in the DoD Component’s Acquisition Executive organization who reportedly favors pushing this ICP idea forward regardless of its merits for reasons that are unclear.

This Working-Level ICP Proponent team has never had any formal DAU or DoD Component International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E) or ICP-specific training, has never evaluated proposed ICP Big O and little O objectives, is unaware that a DoD Stakeholder Analysis and Engagement Decision Framework even exists, and is inclined to advocate for the proposed ICP as quickly as possible to keep their immediate bosses and higher level DoD ICP Advocates happy despite the fact that they don’t know really know if the ICP will benefit DoD, or is even feasible.

Looking Forward

While neither the Ideal nor Nightmare ICP Advocacy Scenarios happen very often, I have seen them both during my 30 years of experience working with various DoD organizations responsible for generating new ICPs, plus a lot of variations in between these polar opposites. 

In general, proposed DoD ICPs that are launched by objective, knowledgeable, and experienced Working-Level Proponent teams eventually succeed in navigating the DoD ICP IA process despite what happens (or doesn’t happen) on Mount Olympus. But it takes more time than it should.  Alternatively, new ICP ideas evaluated by weak, untrained, and inexperienced Working-Level Proponent teams tend to fizzle out, usually after wasting a lot of precious ICP talent and time, at some point in the DoD ICP IA process.  This occurs regardless of high-level rhetoric and exhortations from Mount Olympus about the importance of such ill-conceived ICPs to the Department.

More broadly, most DoD senior officials on Mount Olympus who have come and gone over the past fifteen years have generally favored Defense Sales rather than ICPs.  DoD and industry defense sales to allied and friendly nations have clearly benefitted from this emphasis, which is great news. Unfortunately, DoD’s reduced ICP Advocacy at senior levels during this time period has caused a slow erosion of DoD’s enterprise-wide ability establish new ICPs with our AUKUS partners and other key allied & friendly nations.  Occasional Top-Level ICP Advocacy for 'favored' ICPs hurts more than helps by monopolizing the remaining DoD ICP talent and expertise at the expense of 'B and C' priority ICPs which are left with little or no support. The result is that DoD acquisition organizations are encountering more situations that have nightmarish rather than ideal ICP Proponent efforts and outcomes.  The Department, and our allies and friends, are suffering the consequences. 

In my view, the plethora of complaints about the ‘need for speed’ in negotiating new ICP IAs – which I believe are mostly valid – are actually symptomatic of a much larger problem. The current reality is that the DoD enterprise is unable to develop and negotiate enough high quality ICP IAs in a timely and efficient manner to meet the demand signal coming from its S&T, RDT&E, and System-Level acquisition organizations and prospective partner nations. 

My next blog will explore key cause and effect relationships that are hindering DoD’s ability to establish the number of new ICP IAs needed to achieve USG/DoD and allied/friendly nation strategy and policy goals and objectives.

Until next time, Prof K