The breadth of DoD international agreement categories described in DoD Instruction 5530.03 (International Agreements) is astounding. One of the “niche” categories used by the DoD to establish defense acquisition partnerships with allied/friendly nations and international organizations is International Cooperative Program (ICP) International Agreements (IAs).

While they are relatively small in number – around 50 ICP IAs of various shapes and sizes are established by DoD each year – ICPs can have an enormous impact on U.S. Government (USG) and coalition national security from an operational, technological, economic, political-military, and industrial perspective. 

Perhaps the best known ICP IA is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development (PSFD) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) originally signed in 2006 and resigned (minus Turkey) in 2021.  During its 45-year lifespan, approximately 3,000 F-35s will be cooperatively produced, sustained, and upgraded by the eight partner nations. While it is difficult to provide an exact estimate of the JSF PSFD MOU’s total value with respect to partner procurement actions so far into the future, it will certainly be in the $1 trillion range.  If follow-on U.S. JSF Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of F-35s – which were made possible by the JSF PSFD MOU and its predecessor RDT&E MOUs – were added, the total value would increase to ~$1.5 trillion. 

More recently, the Australia – United Kingdom – United States (AUKUS) partnership’s Pillar II has been prominently featured in the defense media.  Most of the key ongoing and proposed defense acquisition arrangements associated with AUKUS Pillar II will be ICP IAs. 

Common Complaints

Among DoD policy and acquisition generalists, the common perception is that the ICP IA process is overly bureaucratic and too slow.  As it turns out, these same complaints are leveled at the USG/DoD FMS and Technology Security Foreign Disclosure (TSFD).  Misery does not love company, however, so the widely held view that all three of these key IA&E processes are byzantine and delay-ridden does not make ICP IA proponents feel any better. 

Is this perception accurate and, if so, what could be done to improve the current situation?  H. L. Menken observed, “for every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.” Rather than pursue simplistic solutions using the 'ready, fire, aim' method, which waste time and achieve little, the DoD enterprise would be better served by evaluating why the process is so complex prior to recommending substantive changes to the status quo.

Sources of Complexity 

As a point of departure, I would like to ask everyone involved, from senior leaders to the bench scientists, innovators, R&D technologists, and program managers, to accept the fact that the current DoD ICP IA process is purposefully (rather than arbitrary and capriciously) complex.  Here’s a short synopsis of why this is so:

Governance:

• Several U.S. statutes in Title 1, Title 22, and Title 10 IAs (e.g., 1 USC 112b, 22 USC 2767, 10 USC 2350a, and many others) provide DoD with legal authority to enter into ICP by specifying approval authority, content, structural, and procedural requirements.
• In addition, 22 CFR Part 181 (Coordination, Reporting, and Publication of International Agreements) governs DoD ICP IAs from a structural and format perspective, while various other Federal Regulations (e.g., Federal Acquisition Regs, International Traffic in Arms Regs) govern specific areas of content. 
• DoD Instruction 5530.03 (International Agreements) provides amplifying DoD-wide policy guidance on coordination requirements, structure, and format.
• Numerous other DoD Directives, Instructions, Regulations, Handbooks, and Guidebooks provide detailed guidance on acquisition, systems engineering, logistics, T&E, financial management, contracting, security, and other specialized areas. 

As a DoD ICP IA expert, I have read all of these documents.  Take it from me ... it's a lot of guidance to digest and comply with.  ICP IA complexity starts here.

Nature of Partnerships

DoD’s statutory authority to enter into defense acquisition partnerships through ICP IAs covers the entire gamut of DoD acquisition, from early Science & Technology (S&T), through Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E), and System-level development, logistics support, upgrade, and eventual disposal.

DoD is empowered by the various statutes noted above to form ICP IA partnerships with any U.S. ally, Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), Friendly Foreign Country (FFC), or qualifying international organization (e.g., NATO bodies).

DoD may also form a broad range of “equitable” partnerships – equal; U.S. as senior partner; U.S. as junior partner – bilaterally or multilaterally with these nations or international organizations based the pertinent USG authorizing statutes noted above. 

Nature of Business Arrangements

DoD may provide U.S. financial contributions (FCs) and non-financial contributions (NFCs) to the partnership created by the ICP IA and, if needed, receive and expend or use foreign FCs and NFCs provided to the partnership as specified in the ICP IA.

DoD may also contract on behalf of all of the nations in a partnership, or decide to allow another partner nation to contract on its behalf as specified in the ICP IA.

Net Effect

These three areas represent the status quo set of USG/DoD factors that must be dealt with by DoD personnel responsible for ideating, conceptualizing, formulating, developing, negotiating, and signing ICP IAs.  Evolutionary proposals for ICP IA process improvements take these factors as a given.  Revolutionary proposals for ICP IA process improvements focus on changes to these factors, typically in the Governance area.  DoD's allied/friendly nation counterparts responsible for ICP IAs face a similar set of complexities within their nations' governments and defense establishments.  As a result, harmonizing DoD ICP IA process improvement proposals with partner nation MoD/DoD counterparts must be pursued to achieve overall ICP IA performance outcomes.

Speed as a Function of Program/Project Complexity

When formulating a new ICP IA, experts in this field work with DoD acquisition workforce generalists of all types to assess what type of approach would work best to accomplish the objectives of a proposed ICP.  The chart below provides a synopsis of the key aspects they consider.

Speed as a Function of International Agreement Complexity

There are two basic forms of ICP IAs available for use:

Master RDT&E IAs with Project Agreements/Arrangements (PAs) 

Stand Alone IAs 

PAs are much simpler to develop and negotiate since the number of sections and complexity of provisions contained in the Master RDT&E IA’s PA template used to develop and negotiate each individual S&T or RDT&E project is greatly reduced

Stand Alone ICP IAs, which take longer to develop and negotiate due to the greater number of sections and the complexity of its provisions, must be used in two cases:

1. No Master RDT&E IA exists (leaving Stand Alone IA as the only option).
2. System-level programs or projects beyond S&T and RDT&E acquisition efforts (which, by definition, exceed the scope of the Master RDT&E IA).

For reference, the DAU chart below compares the key differences between Simple and Complex ICP IAs:

ICP IA experts work with DoD organizations proposing new ICPs to align the performance, cost, and schedule aspects of the ICP concept with an optimal ICP IA approach and structure.  They do this by focusing on two interrelated areas:

• Which type of ICP approach would work best to implement the proposed cooperative program or project, "Simple" or "Complex"?
• Which type of ICP IA structure would work best to implement the ICP, Master RDT&E MOA PA or Stand Alone IA?

In some cases, the optimal course of action is obvious to DoD and the prospective partner nation(s) after initial, informal consultations.  However, other more complex situations require a substantial amount of informal dialog between DoD ICP IA experts and DoD acquisition organizations arrive at a DoD decision on the best path forward, followed by more informal dialog with the prospective partner nation(s) to reach an initial consensus on the way ahead.  These informal Exploratory Discussions (ExDs) -- which are part art, part science -- play a critical role in preparing for entry into formal ICP IA negotiations on Complex ICPs between DoD and partner nation(s).   Any experienced ICP IA expert will tell you that skipping ExDs to 'begin formal ICP IA negotiations quicker' on Complex ICP IAs will cause substantial delays later in the process.  Avoid making this "rookie" mistake!

Speed as a Function of Number of Partners

Based on historical observation and analysis of actual ICP IA negotiation outcomes, experts in the field have come up with the following heuristic principles:

1. Bilateral ICP IAs can always be negotiated faster than multilaterals.
2. Multilateral ICP IAs among three-to-five compatible nations are exponentially harder and slower to negotiate than a comparable bilateral.
3. Multilateral ICP IAs among five or more compatible nations (e.g., an ICP IA involving several NATO and Major Non-NATO Allies) are exponentially harder and slower to negotiate than 2.
4. Multilateral ICP IAs among five or more nations that are not compatible are asymptotically difficult to negotiate and should only be attempted in the direst circumstances.

Speed as a Function of Talent

Experts in the field have come up with the following rubric for talent-to-task assignment in the formulation, development, and negotiation of ICP IAs:

1. Rookie ICP IA negotiators should assist in the negotiation of simple bilateral PAs.
2. Newly qualified ICP IA negotiators should lead simple, bilateral PA negotiations and assist in simple multilateral PA negotiations
3. As they gain experience, ICP IA negotiators should assist in negotiating complex bilateral and multilateral PAs.
4. Seasoned ICP IA negotiators should lead complex bilateral and multilateral PA negotiations and assist in Stand-Alone IA negotiations.
5. Master ICP IA negotiators should lead Stand-Alone IA negotiations.

At present, there are not enough qualified Level III. – V. ICP DoD IA negotiators available to lead complex bilateral and multilateral PA and Stand-alone ICP IA negotiations.  Shortfalls in experienced ICP negotiators can bog down the DoD ICP IA review and approval system with a plethora of 'simple mistakes' that are not the fault of newly minted ICP IA negotiators ‘thrown into the breach.’ 

Speed as a Function of Capable and Willing Partner(s)

ICP IA negotiations are conducted between DoD and one or more sovereign partner nations at a mutually agreed speed of advance.  If the other partner nation(s) are capable and willing partners interested in reaching prompt agreement, ICP IA negotiations will go quickly.  On the other hand, if they are encountering difficulties in one or more of the set of complexities and functions outlined above within their nation(s), the pace of ICP IA negotiations will slow down or even stop.  

Experts in the ICP negotiation field refer to this as the lowest common denominator syndrome, where the pace of the slowest partner -- U.S. or foreign -- governs the overall pace of negotiations at each step of the process.  

ICP IA Process '101'

The overall DoD ICP IA macro-process includes these steps:

Partner nations' defense organizations operate under different laws, regulations, policies, procedures, and terminology.  In most situations, the macro-process partner nations use is generally similar to DoDs, however, the level of delegation of authority within partner nations begin ICP IA negotiations and obtain authority to sign the final, negotiated ICP IA text may differ.  DoD and partner nation ICP IA experts often have to work together to harmonize these asymmetries to try to minimize delays in the overall macro-process. 

Accordingly, if DoD and partner nation(s) decided to optimize an ICP IA for speed, the least bureaucratic, fastest ICP IA from ‘idea’ to ‘signed IA’ would have the following characteristics:

• ICP Type: S&T or RDT&E
• Program/Project Approach:  Simple
• IA Structure:  PA
• # of Partners: Bilateral
• Talent: Level II. or above
• Capability & Willingness of Partners:  High

Alternatively, if for some strange reason DoD and partner nation(s) chose the most difficult, suboptimized path imaginable for a proposed ICP from 'idea' to 'signed IA,' it would have the following characteristics:

• ICP Type: System-Level or Beyond RDT&E Phase
• Program/Project Approach:  Complex
• IA Structure:  Stand-Alone IA
• # of Partners: Multilateral
• Talent: Level III. or below
• Capability & Willingness of Partners:  Low

Strangely enough, this actually happens sometimes ... but it shouldn't.

Musical Analogies

Some people find analogies to familiar topics helpful, while they may fall flat for others.  Read or skip ahead to the Summary below, as desired.

Simple bilateral PAs are like four chord progression rock songs (e.g., Smoke on the Water by Deep Purple).

Complex bilateral PAs are like progressive rock songs (e.g., Close to the Edge by Yes).

Complex Stand-alone System-Level IAs are like classical symphonies (e.g., Beethoven’s 5th Symphony). 

These are just three types of music; there are many others unmentioned.  Some forms are simpler – some are more complex.  Most individuals' perception of music is both objective and subjective in nature.  All forms of music can be enjoyable when songs or pieces are well written, produced, and performed by 'virtuoso' musicians regardless of genre.  Yet some of the songs we listen to, regardless of the genres we like, objectively sound better than others.  Differences in creativity and talent have a lot to do with this.

I believe that, like music, ICP IAs are judged by U.S. and partner nation reviewers and approvers objectively and subjectively.  In a perfect world, all DoD ICP IA negotiators would possess the critical thinking ability and domain knowledge skills needed to develop and negotiate all types of defense acquisition partnerships -- regardless of program/project and international agreement complexity --to meet U.S. and partner nation reviewers/approvers' expectations with minimal changes.  However, this is a 'big ask,' particularly for ICP IA negotiators with little or no experience. DoD Component International Program Organizations are constantly trying to do their best to match the scarce ICP IA negotiation talent they have with the wide range of partnerships being proposed by DoD acquisition organizations and their prospective partner nation counterparts.  This is particularly difficult when Level IV. and V. talent is in short supply in DoD and among their partner nation counterparts.  

Summary

Back in 2019, I wrote a blog on “International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E) and Lashley’s Laws.”  They illustrate the challenges DoD acquisition decision makers face when making tradeoffs in challenging situations:

1. You can have anything you want [but] …
2. You cannot have everything you want [since] …
3. You decide what you [really] want by what you are willing to give up to get it [and, most importantly] …
4. If you are unwilling to give up anything, what you will get nothing that anyone would want.

If DoD concentrated solely on ICP IA speed, we would end up with quite a few outcome #4s and have very little to show for it despite everyone’s best efforts.  DoD ICP IAs must comply with USG and DoD governance requirements.   Moreover, DoD is responsible for establishing ICP IAs of varying complexity with a broad range allied/friendly nations and international organizations across the entire acquisition lifecycle to meet the needs of the entire DoD acquisition workforce.  Focusing on ICP IA speed alone is clearly not the ‘right answer.’ 

After a bit more reflection, my next blog will offer some thoughts on ICP IA process cause and effect relationships in other areas besides speed to find ways to enhance DoD's status quo performance which, based on my recent observations, needs significant improvement.