Mission
Facilitate the collection, archiving, dissemination and analysis of relevant Army acquisition process Lessons Learned (LL) from After Action Reviews (AARs), existing LL studies, and programmatic histories of Army programs to develop best practices and influence strategic acquisition decisions.
Focus
On 8 January 2012, ASA(ALT) directed AMSAA to create a center to collect, archive, analyze, and disseminate Army lessons learned and develop best practices.

Acquisition Lessons Learned (ALL) is a …

Vehicle for maintaining acquisition experiences, such as program lessons learned and programmatic histories, etc.
Web-based relational database of acquisition program information for Army programs of record.
Capability to conduct analysis.
Resource for building cases to influence policy and procedure.

ALL provides Program Executive Offices and Program Managers access to the Army Acquisition Lessons Learned Portal (ALLP) containing practical lessons learned, best practices, and forums for idea exchange and question resolution. ALL's acquisition process impact studies assist Army leadership (HQDA) to address strategic questions involving policy, regulation, and law implications. Army laboratory and testing agencies gain insight and share experiences to perform Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) risk assessments, conduct testing, promote partnerships, and satisfy compressed timelines.

The ALLP provides an authoritative source for Army acquisition lessons learned. Lessons can be entered by anyone, including contractors. Lesson may be submitted anonymously and may also be imparted to the ALL Team by mail, e-mail, or phone. Other ALLP knowledge management, collaboration, and analysis services, such as viewing and searching lessons submitted by others, participating in forum discussions, referencing acquisition case histories, and more, is government restricted.
Portal URL: https://allp.amsaa.army.mil.
AMSAA's Soldier focus, organizational independence, and materiel LL and acquisition analysis experience make it well suited to perform this Acquisition Lessons Learned mission.
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First places to go:

–       ACQuipedia: https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/
–       DAG: https://dag.dau.mil/

Major References:

–       MRL Handbook:

http://www.dodmrl.org/ 

–       Defense Manufacturing Management Guide for Program Managers:

https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=520540&lang=en-US
Detailed References:

–       Production Readiness Review Checklist:

https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=384094

–       DoD 4245.7-M Transition to Production:

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/424507m.pdf

–       DMSMS Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages

Knowledge Sharing Portal https://acc.dau.mil/dmsms
SD-22 DMSMS Guidebook https://acc.dau.mil/dmsms-guidebook

–       Supply Chain & Counterfeit training

CLL 202 Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) Executive Overview
CLL037 Supply Chain Fundamentals – Available for Mobile Device: http://goo.gl/FZoUL 
CLL 032 Preventing Counterfeit Electronic Parts from Entering the DoD Supply System
CLL 062 Counterfeit Prevention Awareness

–       GAO-10-439 Best Practices: DoD can achieve better outcomes by standardizing the way manufacturing risks are managed

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-439

–       Reliability Information Analysis Center (RIAC) http://www.theriac.org/ 
Provides latest update of useful links with information relevant to Manufacturing for the PM

Great quick aid to understanding and creating Program Framing Assumptions.Attached paper is a good short introduction to the concept of Framing Assumptions, with examples of both good and bad FAs.
bv

The April 2008 edition of the"Defense Acquisition Review Journal is a special edition sponsored by the Defense Acquisition University Alumni Association(DAUAA) and theDAU Research Department. The journalfeatures the winners of thefirst annual Hirsch Research PaperCompetition. The themeforthis year'scontestwasDefense Life Cycle Management: Sustaining DoD Weapon Systems.The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long and consistent history of major program successes and failures. Unfortunately, because of the nature, size, and complexity of DoD endeavors, when projects fail losses are great to both the warfighter and the taxpayer. The question that begs an answer is: Why do DoD's programs and projects continue to fail considering the department's investment in program management and its long history of lessons learned in acquiring major weapons systems? Research suggests that the answer might lie in the execution of the programs and lack of independence in program oversight.

The Joint Operating Environment document is intended to inform joint concept development and experimentation throughout the Department of Defense with a perspective on future trends, potential shocks, military implications, as well as the implications of these issues for the future joint force commander. This document is speculative in nature and does not necessarily represent a USJFCOM or Department of Defense position on any issue. Rather, it is intended to serve as an intellectual ?starting line? for discussions about the structure of the future security environment.

Interesting reading -- Mr Frank Kendall's USD(AT&L) letter to Congress re: Improvements in Defense Acquisition dtd 13 Jun 2014

Bid Protest Annual Reports To Congress
As required by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e)(2), the Comptroller General reports annually to Congress on federal agencies that do not fully implement a recommendation made by GAO in connection with a bid protest decided the prior fiscal year.

Report to Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Congressional Budget Office report dated June 2011.
This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study, prepared at the request of the SenateCommittee on the Budget, projects the costs of the Department of Defense’s plan for nationaldefense for the years 2012 to 2030. The study is the latest in an annual series that CBO haspublished for the past eight years. In particular, it updates the projections contained in CBO’sLong-Term Implications of the Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget, published in February 2011.In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this study makesno recommendations. A future CBO study will examine the implications that possible constraintson defense budgets might have for the future size, composition, and capabilities of themilitary services....

This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report by Ronald O'Rourke is dated March 13, 2013.

This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report by Ronald O'Rourke is dated March 15, 2013.

This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report is dated March 2013.

This Report to Congressional Defense Committees is dated June 2013.

This report is being provided to the Congressional Defense Committees as directed in Public Law 112-239, Section 155, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs.This Congressional Research Service report is dated October 17, 2013

This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report: National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress by Catherine Dale, Specialist in International Security, is dated August 6, 2013.