New Research in DEFENSE ACQUISITION

Academics and practitioners from around the globe have long considered defense acquisition as a subject for serious scholarly research, and have published their findings not only in books, but also as Doctoral dissertations, Master's theses, and in peer-reviewed journals. Each issue of the *Defense Acquisition Research Journal* brings to the attention of the defense acquisition community a selection of current research that may prove of further interest.

These selections are curated by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Research Center and the Knowledge Repository. We present here only the author/title, abstract (where available), and a link to the resource. Both civilian government and military Defense Acquisition Workforce (DAW) readers will be able to access these resources on the DAU DAW Website: https://identity.dau.mil/EmpowerIDWebIdPForms/Login/KRsite. Nongovernment DAW readers should be able to use their local knowledge management centers and libraries to download, borrow, or obtain copies. We regret that DAU cannot furnish downloads or copies.

We encourage our readers to submit suggestions for current research to be included in these notices. Please send the author/title, abstract (where available), a link to the resource, and a short write-up explaining its relevance to defense acquisition to: Managing Editor, *Defense Acquisition Research Journal*, Defense ARJ@dau.mil.



Brandon J. Kinne

Abstract:

Bilateral defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs, are now the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad, defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in such fundamental areas as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Although nearly a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wide-ranging impacts on national and international security outcomes, DCAs have been largely ignored by scholars. Why have DCAs proliferated? The author develops a theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social network analysis. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s have fueled demand for DCAs. States use DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-minded states. Yet, demand alone cannot explain DCA proliferation; to cooperate, governments must also overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts. The author shows that network influences increase the supply of DCAs by providing governments with information about the trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions of gains. DCAs become easier to sign as more states sign them. The author also identifies two specific network influences—preferential attachment and triadic closure—and shows that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War diffusion of DCAs. Novel empirical strategies further indicate that these influences derive from the proposed informational mechanism. States use the DCA ties of others to glean information about prospective defense partners, thus endogenously fueling further growth of the global DCA network.

Citation:

Kinne, B. J. (2018). Defense cooperation agreements and the emergence of a global security network. *International Organization, 72*(4), 799–837. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000218

Why Buy American? The International Politics of Fighter Jet Transfers

Srdjan Vucetic and Atsushi Tago

Abstract:

When it comes to buying military aircraft, what leads states to prefer one supplier over the other? This article explores this question from the perspective of international relations theory. First, the authors use social network analysis to map out fighter jet transfers during and after the Cold War and examine the extent to which historical structures of international hierarchy shape contemporary supplier-receiver relationships. Next, they use a basic probit model to analyze the origins of fighter jets in the world's air forces today to evaluate the effect of interstate orders of superordination and subordination on sourcing patterns. All things being equal, the more a state is embedded in U.S. security and economic hierarchy, the more it is likely to buy American-made fighter jets.

Citation:

Vucetic, S., & Tago, A. (2015). Why buy American? The international politics of fighter jet transfers. *Canadian Journal of Political Science, 48*(1), 101-124. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423914001103

Three Competing Options for Acquiring Innovation

Daniel E. Schoeni

Abstract:

The DoD's technological edge is eroding. Since 2015, the department has pursued a strategy to regain the lead. During the Obama administration, it was called the Third Offset. The Trump administration has abandoned that nomenclature, but it is pursuing the same objective. The DoD seeks dominance in robotics, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and three-dimensional printing, among other fields. It recognizes, however, that such innovation will not come from the usual sources—government labs or the defense industrial base. Nondefense firms have a decisive lead: the center of gravity in cutting-edge, military-applicable research is shifting abruptly away from the defense establishment to relatively new commercial firms. Keiran Walsh's three alternatives, defense economists Parker and Hartley explain, correspond to coercion, competition, and long-term partnering. Of course, the same option needn't be chosen for every procurement, and perhaps different alternatives may work better in some cases than in others. But the DoD must choose from these options as it determines how to buy innovation from nondefense commercial suppliers and perhaps should identify a default that works best in most cases.

Citation:

Schoeni, D. E. (2018). Three competing options for acquiring innovation. Air & Space Power Journal, 32(4), 85-93. Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (2153563476). Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/2153563476?accountid=403900