Simulations: The Studied Practice of Excellence

Eugene A. Razzetti

In the March-April 2019 issue of Defense Acquisition magazine, I discussed the value of simulation in decision making and recommended that tabletop and/or wargame exercises replace traditional case studies in both classroom and actual decision making. I based this largely on my previous work as a military analyst, during which I helped to establish a new command in the U.S. Navy.

This is also where we look for (and hopefully find) what famed management consultant W. Edwards Deming called “Profound Knowledge.” Deming’s theory of profound knowledge is a management philosophy grounded in systems theory. It is based on the principle that an organization is a system of interrelated processes and people. The success of all participants within the project is dependent on the ability of the Department of Defense (DoD) to orchestrate the delicate balance of each component for optimization of the entire system.

This is Part II of what will be a three-part series. This article moves on to developing the simulations (for tabletops and wargames) supported by pointed, actionable approaches that some modern management books collectively call the practice of excellence.

Part III will add still more detail to the work of the simulation development processes, helping planners and project managers create effective tabletop or wargame exercises in real time, and leading to actionable conclusions and recommendations.

Case studies can tell us a great deal about the past; but very little about the present, and virtually nothing about the future, unless we are determined to repeat the same mistakes over and over again. DoD should take whatever worthwhile case study/history data it can extract from the past and use it to inform and predict the future—discarding what it doesn’t need and modeling the rest to enhance what it does need.

Moreover, DoD executive training facilities (such as the Defense Acquisition University) should consider forsaking the study of outdated, abstract and otherwise sterile program management case studies, and instead work directly on current, real-world DoD problems posed by current, real-world warfighters, program managers and scenarios.

Unlike the ‘here it is, read it’ structure of the case study, tabletops and wargames are iterative processes, in which the players work through tailored, timely and realistic scenarios. The dynamic structure of the simulations helps players not only arrive at (hopefully correct) conclusions and actionable decisions but to work through the decision-making processes themselves, thereby gaining decision-making expertise and learning about the effects of those decisions.

Simulations allow case study program management problems to come to life by providing:

• An actual, evolving, sequence of events
• Player participation/interaction in the play of the game
• Immediate (albeit artificial) feedback
• Critical analyses, as opposed to simple data review
• Gaming of outcomes (through modeling and simulation)
• New theories for testing and their implications
• An early appreciation for the fog of war

Figure 1, from the previous article, summarizes the general requirements for simulation in a tabletop or wargame. This article expands each of the four areas in the figure and suggests proven management practices and approaches that lead to “excellent” decisions. Part III will go into further detail.

Figures 2 through 5 include some of the abbreviations with footnotes that may cause some confusion. Most of the terms, however, are self-explanatory or in common use in the military. The brown boxes to the left in the figures cover the best management practices that are essential to program management in general, and to forming the exercise and the decisions that come from it in particular.

Concept Development

Think cybersecurity: Information is the only weapon that can be in more than one place at a time.

“Concept development” is where tabletop or wargame construction begins. Mission identification and analysis must contain not only the exciting (live firings) but the mundane (Continental United States “reachback”) as well. Cargo movement operations, for example, need alternate routes in the event of chemical or biological agent attack and the potential requirement to decontaminate. Nothing is accepted without scrutiny. Overarching issues must be identified. Lessons from the past must be analyzed before they are learned; and even then should be re-evaluated to confirm that they were correct then and remain applicable now.

Any mission, whether executed in Afghanistan or Washington, must include a cybersecurity and network-centric approach to command and control. It has been wisely said that information is the only weapon that can be in two places at the same time.

Envisioning a “maneuver force” as the end-product can give meaning and (hopefully) justification to what might have been just an abstract or stand-alone weapon or platform. Every product must be a provably effective component of the team.

Figure 2 includes the essential elements of Concept Development.

A SWOT analysis guides you to identify your organization’s strengths and weaknesses (S-W), as well as broader opportunities and threats (O-T). Developing a fuller awareness of the situation helps with both strategic planning and decision making.

DoD no longer can afford any single-mission platforms. Rather, there should be multiple missions and taskings envisioned for any platform. Accordingly, concept development and justification should reflect, in my opinion, agreement of characteristics through at least six separate but similar scenarios.

A good way to add structure to concept development is with Tactical Situations, or TACSITs. These are likely mission and threat-oriented scenarios in which the product (e.g., weapon, sensor system, or platform) is to be employed. We’ll cover TACSIT development in greater detail in Part III.

For ease of explanation, we’ll use the term “platform” to mean a proposed tactical landing craft for insertion of special forces. TACSITs should include, at a minimum:

• The mission to be addressed by the platform, as specifically stated as possible
• The enemy order of battle and all available intelligence
• Climatological and environmental conditions
• Traveling range, maximum speeds, acoustic signature, sea state, limiting draft
• Offensive and defensive weaponry

Research

Every exercise participant must be a provably effective member of the team. Self-sufficiency is insufficient.

“Research” means the most comprehensive contribution of the most qualified, experienced contributors, using the most current data, and without regard for branch of service or other bias. There must be the nicest sense of partnership and the common goal of building the optimal product for the troops at the front. This is where the project manager partners with the operators to ensure the optimal product is developed by the optimal methods. Neither can work independently, and self-sufficiency is insufficient.

Contractors, sometimes called “subject-matter experts,” may credibly sign up. However, real, productive, partnership is never assured and often remains elusive, despite the signatures. A classic breach of ethics occurs when a contractor takes on a job for which he or she has insufficient expertise or an inappropriate motivation. It’s almost “a hanging offense” among ethical management consultants, but has become “business as usual” among contractors; and anyone can answer a request for proposals.

In an earlier article on “Risk Management” (Defense AT&L magazine, July-August 2016), I discussed the role of host nations. Host nation support can involve force protection, interpreters, crane operators and anything in between. It is crucial that developers with operational backgrounds provide host nation support input on this issue for the simulation, in order to properly assess (and quantify) the impact of host nation support. Depending on the scenario (e.g., dealing with corrupt local officials), host nation “support” may make conditions worse.

Figure 3 blends exciting operational stuff and boring project management stuff, for a battle to be fought in both the trenches and the cubicles. I suggest use of, if not certification to, ISO 9000, ISO 27000 and ISO 28000. Use of these proven international certification standards, and insistence on certification to them by contractors, can form action-oriented structure and quantifiable, actionable, goals and objectives for DoD project managers. Action-oriented structure means quality manuals, flow charts, replicable processes, cybersecurity basics, such as network penetration testing, and personnel training and qualification standards.

Planning for support operations such as cargo loading and offloading and associated movement through a strategic port must allow for the possibility of real or threatened attack with chemical or biological agents, the attendant requirement to re-route cargo around the contamination, and/or to effectively and provably decontaminate the cargo.

Integration of Ideas Into a Prototype

The network is the structure and the structure is the network.

Tabletop exercises may be the first opportunity project management personnel have to interact with counterparts with real, in-theater experience. Developing the prototype structure for the simulation also is where we develop the prototype command and control network for the actual operations. Simulations address long-haul issues like Sustainment and Persistence more methodically than case studies. Similarly, they address vulnerabilities to the forces dynamically, reflecting the ever-changing threat conditions. The network is the structure and the structure is the network.

Simulations must address the entire life cycle of the scenario. Personnel and material resources are not just positioned at the scene of action as on a chess board. The mission(s) may require forces to remain on-station for months or longer. The requirement for a “1.0 presence” of a ship (for example) may require three ships, depending on the location and scenario. The range and depth of consumables, such as gas mask cartridges, must reflect both normal and surge requirements.
Figure 4 provides the general guidance for developing the prototype simulation, whether a tabletop or a full-blown wargame. Again, apply the expertise of both operators and program managers to both the exciting and the mundane—and design the simulation for extended operations.

Exercise Development

Having done all the preparation, it is now time to design the game and to create the simulation. Again, everything done to this point in the developmental processes will work for either a tabletop or a wargame, and DoD can look forward to a product that dwarfs in benefit even the most comprehensive case study. The next article in the series, Part III, will focus on developing a tabletop.

Figure 5 describes the exercise development processes. Exercise development also is where planners do what they are supposed to do: Plan. All areas of operational and programmatic expertise meld the exercise components into a functioning, dynamic, living system, with a goal of creating a comprehensive exercise that uses the best information to arrive at the best possible conclusions, recommendations, strategies, tactics and concepts of operations (CONOPS). The planning team should also include experienced tabletop and/or wargame facilitators, who can orchestrate and streamline the processes.

Planning includes battlespace management, or who does what—and where. Standard operating procedures (SOPs), CONOPS and checklists, reduce the battlespace management to workable and replicable practices and procedures, chains of command, and communications networks. Logistic planners structure the supply chain for normal and surge operations in accordance with the threat scenarios, timelines, weather and the environment.

This is also where planners take a critical look at technological “yield.” That is, do the resources, however complex, optimally and successfully accomplish the missions, or is a greater capability required.

Summary

Case studies may tell us a great deal about the past; but very little about the present, and virtually nothing about the future, unless we are determined to repeat the same mistakes over and over again. DoD should take whatever worthwhile case study/history data it can extract from the past and use it to inform and predict the future—discarding what it doesn’t need and modeling the rest to enhance what it does need.

Tactical Situations, or TACSITs, describe likely mission and threat-oriented scenarios in which the product is to be employed. The tabletop should be a compendium of at least six TACSIT scenarios, in order to thoroughly assess the intended product or system.

Employing proven modern management processes and techniques, such as SWOT, Risk and Gap analyses, plus the applicable ISO International Standards, operators and program managers can identify and quantify threats and vulnerabilities, fully define needs, and identify and justify requirements.

Unlike the “right answer” provided at the end of the case study, simulation participants develop a range of jointly developed options, and sharpen their decision-making skills in the performance.

DoD would do well to consider abandoning the study of outdated, abstract, and otherwise sterile case studies, and focus directly on current, real-world problems posed by current, real-world warfighters, program managers and scenarios.

We have talked about replacing “What happened?” with “What if?” In Part III, we’ll move on to What’s next?” and (hopefully) “What a good idea!”

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RAZZETTI, a retired U.S. Navy captain, is a management consultant, auditor, and military analyst, and a frequent contributor to DAU. He is the author of five management books, including Fixes that Last—The Executive’s Guide to Fix It or Lose It Management, and has served on the advisory boards of two business schools.

The author can be reached at [email protected].

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and not the Department of Defense. Reproduction or reposting of articles from Defense Acquisition magazine should credit the authors and the magazine.