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# REQUIREMENTS 2100

## Application Skills for Requirements Managers

### Student Workbook - Module 2: The Capability Development Document (CDD)



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## Course Progress

By now, you should have completed and saved the Module 1 ICD Workbook. If not, close this workbook, reopen the Module 1 workbook, and complete and save your work. As a recap:

### Module 2, The Capability Development Document (CDD)

Module 2 moves the Army's Module 1 notional deep strike scenario forward in time and consists of this Module 2 Workbook, a notional draft Deep Strike Missile System (DSMS) Capability Development Document (CDD), results of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), the knowns and unknowns, decisions, and solution refinements associated with progression through the MSA and TMRR acquisition phases, feedback from the Army Chief, the Army Service Acquisition Executive (SAE), the Program Manager (PM), and other artifacts.

Exactly as you did in Module 1, you will complete AND save your work in this Module 2 Workbook prior taking your RQM 2100 end-of-course exam.


**(NOTE:** Again, DO NOT neglect to record and save your Module 2 Workbook answers –you will need to refer to BOTH completed workbooks to pass the exam with 80% or better).

Module 2 moves the scenario forward in time to the refining of a draft CDD to prepare it for validation. As you recall from RQM 11XX, the draft CDD proposes development of a materiel capability solution intended to satisfy the gaps wholly or partially in Warfighter capability requirements first documented in the ICD.

The solution must eliminate or mitigate those capability gaps for which DoD leadership does not accept operational risk - otherwise, why devote time and national resources to pursuing the solution? Think of the CDD as the communications vehicle that ultimately guides the development and fielding of the selected materiel solution needed to meet Warfighter needs.

Unlike the ICD, effective CDDs clearly state what the materiel solution's system performance must be when delivered to the Warfighter.

The PM is responsible for delivering on the performance attributes called for in the CDD, and a well-written CDD by you, the RM, sets the stage for production and deployment success.



## RQM 2100 Exam:

You'll use your completed Module 1 and 2 Workbooks, the ICD and CDD JSTs, and the appropriate parts of the JCIDS Manual to take the RQM 2100 end-of-course exam.

## RQM 2100 Course Feedback:

Due to the unique purpose of RQM 2100 for training applications-based skills, we designed it in such a way that most of your work is on your own outside the DAU online system. To better meet RM workforce training needs, we ask that you provide your feedback on the course material. The RQM 2100 Course Survey is posted to [RQM 2100 Course Survey](#). Please complete it as you complete various tasks in this workbook. You will see this link again at the end of this workbook.

## Additional Helpful Information:

To complete the tasks in the Module 2 Workbook and pass the end-of-course exam, you'll need to access, read, and comprehend additional reading.

## Required Reading

- Materiel Development Decision (MDD) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
- Milestone A Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
- Draft Deep Strike Missile System (DSMS) draft CDD
- CDD Job Support Tool (JST)
- JCIDS Manual - parts referred to in the CDD JST
- Draft Deep Strike Mission Capability-Army (DSMC-A) ICD
- Joint Capability Area Framework Definitions
- DoDI 5000.85

Remember, the CDD JST is not a stand-alone tool. It is a companion to the CDD format in the JCIDS Manual (Appendix C to Enclosure B). The CDD JST also addresses the IS-CDD; however, we will not be dealing with the IS-CDD in this course.

Recommend you have both the CDD JST and the CDD section of the JCIDS Manual in front of you as you complete this workbook.

**You're now ready to begin the CDD portion of RQM 2100.**

## Module 2: Deep Strike Missile System (DSMS) Scenario

First, open and watch the file "Module 2 Boom Boom Video" - concentrate on the various missile systems:



### Recap of the Last 28 Months

Since arriving, you've gained a wealth of experience while working in your requirements billet at Army Futures Command's, Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) CFT, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma – you're now the “wise and grizzled old timer” on the deep strike program. You've watched how the situation unfolded for the last 28 months through the Materiel Solution Analysis and Technology Maturation and Risk reduction phases, and you now realize you have essentially four goals before moving on to your next assignment:

1. Finish the draft DSMS CDD so that it quickly moves to validation with the least amount of staffing headache.
2. Successfully prepare, inform, and support the leadership for a favorable Milestone B decision.
3. Help the PM office (PMO) set up the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase for success.
4. Set up the next occupant of your requirements billet to quickly pick up the DSMS project as you're walking out the door in eager anticipation of your next operational assignment.

After valiantly updating and successfully moving your DSMC-A ICD through some rough internal and external staffing, you've watched your project mature to the next phase, stakeholders change (along with their priorities), budgets change, and external events influence your work. Most importantly, you've seen your project move from identifying and documenting Army deep strike capability gaps to now concentrating on successfully fielding a materiel solution that meets a portion of your Warfighter's overall capability needs. Let's recap those events in chronological order and review the highlights:

## Authority to Enter the Acquisition Process

### 1. **JROC Validation of the Deep Strike Mission Capability-Army (DSMC-A) ICD.**

Although the Army indicated no joint performance requirements (JPRs) and recommended a Joint Staffing Designator (JSD) of Joint Information, the Joint Staff J8 Gatekeeper saw it rather differently and decided on issuing the DSMC-A ICD a JSD level of JROC Interest. The rationale:

- a. Since all weapons/weapons systems have the potential of being deployed together or employed in joint environments, weapons and weapons systems will be considered joint systems within the JCIDS process and may be designated as JROC or JCB Interest.
  - b. DSMC-A (or at least some spinoff element) has a strong potential to evolve into a multi-service capability.
  - c. The Marine Corp employs launch systems that would likely support the extended range capability.
  - d. During the subsequent KM/DS staffing of the ICD, neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps expressed interest in the enhanced capability. However, both immediately clarified that they would re-evaluate their need for the deep strike capabilities after the Army's AoA, prototyping results, and cost estimates provided more data.
2. **Exportability Considerations.** The OSD staff had initially recommended an ACAT ID designation for DSMS. Their rationale:
- a. Some international partners use the likely launch systems supporting the capability requirement, this initially indicated a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review for the Material Development Decision (MDD). However:
  - b. During subsequent conversations between the Army SAE and Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), the DAE agreed with the Army position that the technologies required for the enhanced deep strike capabilities weren't appropriate for export due to national security considerations. This position change was bolstered by the recent NATO systems deployment challenges posed by Turkey, who employs the current ATACMS system.
3. Consequently, as an ACAT IB program<sup>1</sup>, the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) conducted the MDD review IAW AR 70-1.

## Material Development Decision (MDD) Review.

The following were major considerations and discussion points during the ASARC MDD review:

1. **Cannon Artillery.** Although the ICD indicated capability gaps for both cannon and missile artillery, the Army Futures Command (AFC) and the Army staff decided during the Army Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) review that the scope of the MDD would ONLY consider the missile capability gap and defer the cannon capability gap. The state of technology and research on further extending the range of cannon

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<sup>1</sup> See DoDI 5000.85, Appendix 3A, ACATs.

artillery was simply not ready for prime time. AFC would recommend actions to take for cannon artillery to the SAE as a separate program.

2. **AoA Prep.** Army G-8 presented the missile AoA Study Guidance and AoA Study Plan approved by the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE).
3. **Air Force Involvement.** The Army Chief of Staff (hereafter referred to as the “Chief”) had received an email from a retired Air Force general officer recommending that the Army amend their deep strike missile AoA Study Guidance and AoA Study Plan to include the use of Air Force aircraft to mitigate the Army’s deep strike problem. However, the AFC Commander pointed out that the DSMC-A CBA Study Team had considered that option as a non-materiel solution and rejected due to rapid reaction capabilities of a ground launched missile against time-sensitive targets, and weather constraints on both Air Force and Army air assets. Further, during the KM/DS staffing of the DSMC-A ICD, the Air Force neither raised the issue for discussion nor issued a critical, non-concur comment during the DSMC-A ICD staffing.
4. **Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF) Pathway.** All MDD members agreed that using the Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) pathway would induce unnecessary programmatic risk due to technology maturation issues, threat updates, and changing priorities, was not likely to be approved by the USD(A&S) and settled upon the Major Capability Acquisition (MCA) Pathway of the AAF for milestones, other decisions, and phases. Discussions centered on using the streamlining flexibility inherent in the MCA pathway and the Army’s authority and responsibility to streamline as appropriate as the program evolves.
5. **Acquisition Phase Entry.** Given the decision above, some MDD members then advocated skipping the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase, scheduling a Milestone A review in the next three months, and entering into the Technology Management and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase as the next activity. This would include the commensurate technology demonstrations of candidate solutions from industry along with a concurrent AoA to function as a comparative analysis of the candidate solutions. The Army SAE, with guidance from the new Army Chief, decided against skipping the MSA Phase. Their rationale:
  - a. The Chief must concur with the cost, schedule, technical feasibility, and performance trade-offs that have been made with regard to the program before Milestone A approval is granted, and absent the rigor of an AoA, did not think he could do that.
  - b. The SAE reasoned that the state of proven technology, knowledge of potential candidate solutions, and other data such as cost, and the threat was simply not sufficient to support waiving the MSA phase and entering the acquisition process at TMRR.
  - c. The SAE felt confident that a well-established program with the right solution could be accelerated later in the acquisition process—if warranted.
6. **Exportability.** G-8 pointed out that the CONOPS of the validated DSMC-A ICD was not specific on allied/partner interoperability and coalition use per the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy IAW the JCIDS Manual. AFC supported this point and indicated they



had discussed exportability considerations with OSD. The ICD was not specific on exportability because:

- a. At that point in the program's evolution, it was simply too early to make informed decisions on the export of this highly lethal technology.
  - b. The SAE agreed and indicated that exportability would be considered at Milestone A in accordance with DoDI 5000.85.
7. **Signed MDD Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).** After the MDD review, the SAE signed an ADM that:
- a. Designated the PM and PEO.
  - b. Designated DSMS a pre-Major Defense Acquisition Program.
  - c. Directed that The Research and Analysis Center (TRAC) conduct an AoA to determine the most cost-effective replacement strategy for Army deep strike precision fires.
  - d. Directed the PEO to return for a Milestone A at a tentative date.
  - e. Indicated an initial affordability goal.

### **Matériel Solutions Analysis (MSA) Phase**

The following major events occurred during the MSA Phase:

1. **PM Appointment.** The Army SAE formally appointed a PM (designated in the ADM), and indicated support as necessary for preparation for Milestone A.
2. **AoA Prep.** The Army G-8 directed the immediate creation of an AoA Study Advisory Group (SAG) to monitor and direct the AoA.
3. **Industry.** The PM conducted an Advanced Planning Briefing for Industry highlighting the capability gaps in the DSMC-A ICD and issued a corresponding Request for Information (RFI) to Industry asking for information on potential solutions.
4. **AoA Conduct.**
  - a. The Army had submitted a memo to DCAPE 20 days prior to the MDD review confirming that actions had been taken to ensure the AoA will be completed within 9 months IAW DoDI 5000.84.
  - b. The DSMS AoA Team completed their analyses within the 9-month constraint, comparing three potential candidates, using the current MLRS/HIMARS launch platforms along with the ATACMs missile capabilities as the base case:
    - Option 1:** An enhanced, heavy transport-based wheeled launcher, with the capability to launch one newly developed DSMS missile. This option would replace both the MLRS tracked launcher, the HIMARS truck-based launcher, and the ATACMS missile.
    - Option 2:** A single DSMS missile that would directly replace the ATACMs and remain compatible with the current MLRS (including HIMARS) launch systems.

**Option 3:** A system of two DSMS missile variants that would replace the single ATACMs missile launch pod capability for MLRS and HIMARS while necessitating some “minor” existing launcher modifications.

- c. The AoA Study Team presented the final out briefing to the SAG and provided their DSMS AoA Final Report to the DCAPE, the JROC, the Chief, and the SAE. Their preferred solution was Option 3, the dual DSMS missile compatible with the MLRS and HIMARS launch systems with “minor” modifications.
- d. The SAE provided the Joint Staff, the USD(A&S), the USD(R&E), and the DCAPE an options matrix (Figure 3, DoDI 5000.85) the results of an independent analysis of AoA results. Analytical results were submitted to the SAE and a Goal Establishment Meeting (GEM) conducted.
- e. The SAE considered GEM advice provided by OSD and Joint Staff and approved goals for cost, schedule, and performance (Figure 4, DoDI 5000.85).
- f. DCAPE submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army and the SAE indicating that AoA results were adequate and consistent with the study guidance.
- g. Given the additional data and stakeholder discussions, the SAE, the MDA, rejected the AoA Team’s Option 3 preferred solution and chose instead to pursue Option 2: A single DSMS missile in a pod that is fully compatible with current HIMARS and MLRS launchers with no modifications.
- h. The Chief directed AFC to prepare a draft CDD to support Milestone A and the RFP for the TMRR phase to reflect Option 2. The Chief approved the draft CDD.

## **Milestone A Preparation**

The Army staff considered the following to prepare for the Milestone A review:

1. Justification. Both the affordability and feasibility of the preferred solution
2. Identification. The critical technologies needing maturing during the TMRR phase.
3. The Draft CDD. The scope of the capability requirement trade space, and an understanding of the priorities within that trade space.
4. ASA(FM&C) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE), approved by DCAPE.
5. Technical risks and plans to mitigate those risks identified by the PM.
6. The proposed Acquisition Strategy.
7. The draft Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP).
8. The draft Test & Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).
9. Life-Cycle Mission Data Plan: For each intelligence mission data-dependent program (including cyber), the projected threat, and the threat’s impact on the materiel solution.
10. Briefing: A briefing on the TMRR’s Draft RFP presented by the SAE’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Procurement (DASA(P)).

## Milestone A Review

At the Milestone A review the PM presented the acquisition strategy, the business approach, “should cost” targets, framing assumptions, and an assessment of program risks and mitigation actions. Attendees also discussed initial product support planning.

1. Highlights: The G-8 presented an affordability analysis and ensured the SAE that the program was fully funded in the FYDP.
2. Decisions: The SAE confirmed that the Secretary and Chief concurred in the cost, schedule, and technical feasibility of the materiel solution, and that the planning for progression into development was sound, then signed an ADM approving entry into the TMRR phase, the acquisition strategy, release of the final RFP for TMRR, exit criteria to complete TMRR, and entrance criteria for the EMD phase.
3. Milestone A Determinations (10 USC 4251). After the Milestone A review, the SAE signed a memorandum confirming that the JROC had been consulted and determining that: The program fulfilled an approved ICD; market research had been conducted; there was a plan to reduce risk; an AoA had been performed; a cost estimate was submitted; resources were available to develop, procure and sustain the program; and that there were no technologies that would delay fielding of the program.

## Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) Phase

The following major events occurred during the TMRR phase:

1. Final RFP Release and source selection: Prototyping contracts were awarded to Blue Moon Defense Systems, Inc., and Massive Missiles and Armament Enterprises, Inc. The RFP provided technical specifications, the draft CDD that described top-level performance attributes per the SAE’s solution choice, and the OMS/MP.
2. Product Support Planning: Continued with an update to the LCSP.
3. Developmental Testing (DT): Each contractor conducted in-house testing, selectively observed by the PM and RM, providing insight on design progress against the draft DSMS CDD KPPs. The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) conducted a series of DT events using the test facilities at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR).
4. Early Operational Assessments (EOAs) were conducted by ATECs Operational Test Command (OTC) concurrent with the testing at WSMR.
5. Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs): The PM conducted a series of PDRs with each contractor, and a final systems-level PDR to inform both the CDD content and the RFP for the next phase, Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD).
6. Cost Documents: DCAPE approved ASA(FM&C)’s revised ICE and Component Cost Position (CCP) reflecting knowledge gained during the TMRR phase competitive prototyping activity. The PM’s life cycle cost estimate and the ICE were consistent.

## Next Steps

The following are significant events in the works for both the requirements and acquisition communities associated with the DSMS effort:

1. CDD Staffing Preparation: The RM needs to update the draft CDD with results of the TMRR phase and begin the staffing process necessary for validation (see the CDD JST).
2. Acquisition Document Processing: The PM needs to update the Acquisition Strategy and prepare the additional information required by the Adaptive Acquisition Framework Document Identification (AAFDID) tool<sup>2</sup> for the Development RFP Decision Review (DRFPDR), and draft an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) document for approval at Milestone B.

After reviewing these events through the lens of your experience since reading LTC Schmedley's memo, you now realize – again - you have your work cut out for you. Fortunately for you, your experience with the LRPF CFT, getting the draft ICD in shape for successful validation, experiencing the MDD and Milestone A review, and attending program reviews during the TMRR phase, you have experience and knowledge needed to keep things moving to field a system that meets Warfighter deep strike needs. Unfortunately, you now realize how much truly needs to be done, the hurdles you face, and the short time you have to “git er done.”

### **Time to now roll up your sleeves & get to work preparing for the CDD validation...**

**The following sections include the same “checks” (gut/analysis/knowledge) with associated questions that you saw in the Module 1 Workbook. Refer to the JCIDS Manual and the CDD JST. Indicate your answers and fill in the “explain” blocks, as necessary. The “my notes” blocks are for you to include notes to yourself. Check all your answers against the reference material provided at the end of the workbook, and revise/update your answers and your “my notes” information as appropriate.**

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<sup>2</sup> DoDI 5000.85 designates AAFDID as official policy for milestone and phase information requirements.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 1 (KC 1)

**KC 1.1.** How many sections and appendices are there in the body of a CDD?

- a. 4 Sections and 5 Appendices
- b. 9 Sections and 3 Appendices
- c. 13 Sections and Appendices
- d. 15 Sections and 3 Appendices
- e. None of the above

**My Notes:**

**KC 1.2.** What is the maximum page length of the CDD?

- a. 30 pages
- b. 45 pages
- c. 60 pages
- d. 120 pages

**My Notes:**

### CCD Review

**Now you will review each section of the Draft CDD.**

## Section 1, Operational Context

**Section 1, Operational Context.** The purpose of this section is to provide the operational context in which the capability requirements defined in the ICD are being addressed by the proposed CDD.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 2 (KC 2)

**KC 2.1.** If your CDD was not supported by a validated ICD, what action should you take?

- a. Develop an ICD that describes the mission-related capability requirements that will support your CDD.
- b. In Section 1 of your CDD, provide the operational context and initial DoDAF OVs that would have been outlined in Section 1 of an ICD.
- c. In lieu of an ICD, cite other source documents that identify the capability requirements identified in your CDD.

**My Notes:**

**KC 2.2.** If any changes to the operational context have been made since the ICD was validated, what action should you take? Select all that apply:

- a. Revise Section 1 of the ICD and resubmit the revised ICD with your CDD for validation.
- b. Ensure Section 1 of your CDD addresses any changes to the operational context.
- c. Ensure the DoDAF OV's submitted with the ICD are updated to reflect the changes.
- d. If there are no required DoDAF OVs available for updating, contact the CBA study team and request they provide them.

**My Notes:**



### ANALYSIS CHECK 1 (AC 1)

**AC 1.1.** You learned during your assessment of Workbook 1 that Section 1, Operational Context, of the ICD was missing a topic that should be considered. What was that topic, and does it also apply to Section 1 of your CDD?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

**AC 1.2.** Refer to the DSMS OV-1 in the CDD. Focus on the threshold and objective values for range called for in the OV-1. Are those in alignment with the range gap as called for in the ICD? Is this a “joint warfighting” OV-1? What is missing?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

## Section 2, Threat Summary

**Section 2, Threat Summary.** This section of the CDD is to ensure the capability solution(s) being developed to address the capability requirements and associated gaps are based on consistent threat environment information. Review Section 2 and answer the following questions.



### ANALYSIS CHECK 2 (AC 2)

**AC 2.** Carefully review the Threat Assessment Extract. Is Section 2 of your CDD in sync with the System Survivability KPP, as required?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 3 (KC 3)

**KC 3.1.** Operating in a non-lethal environment eliminates the need for using the most current Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE)- or Service-approved threat products.

- a. True
- b. False



**My Notes:**

**KC 3.2.** What are the threat capabilities changes to which could critically impact the effectiveness and survivability of the DSMS, and who establishes them?

- a. Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIPs) established collaboratively by the requirements sponsor and the capability developer.
- b. CIPs established by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE).
- c. CIPs established by the Service Intelligence Agency and approved by the DIE.
- d. System Survivability and Force Protection attributes established by the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).

**My Notes:**

### Section 3, Capability Discussion

**Section 3, Capability Discussion.** This section of the CDD is to identify the validated capability requirements and associated capability gaps addressed by the CDD, and to outline the results of related studies or analysis performed since validation of the capability requirements.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 4 (KC 4)

**KC 4.1.** Below is a CDD CR to Performance Attribute Traceability table template that follows the JCIDS Manual. This table is required in Section 3, Capability Discussion, of your CDD. The table depicts the contribution of your CDD to the fulfillment of capability requirements and

closing of capability gaps described in the Deep Strike Mission Capability ICD. However, this table was left out of your draft CDD. Using this template that follows the format in the JCIDS Manual, fill- in the missing data.

Capability Requirements (CR)			Significant Gap(s)/Overlap(s)	CDD Contribution
	Operational Attribute/Metric	Initial Objective Value		
1. Capability Requirement <i>(Task, Condition, and Standard)</i>				List Source ICD
	1.1			
2. Capability Requirement <i>(Task, Condition, and Standard)</i>			Effectiveness: Probability of Damage (PD) versus (vs) point targets and Fractional Damage (FD) for area targets, respectively employing the quantities of missiles shown at the given TLE as indicated in classified Appendix D, Table 5.1	List Source ICD
	Probability of Damage	70% vs point targets		
	Fractional Damage	30% vs area targets		

**My Notes:**

**KC 4.2.** The Capability Gap and Overlap table provided for question KC 4.1 includes the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in Littorals ICD as a source. When is the use of more than one source ICD for a CDD permitted? Select all that apply.

- a. When the capability solution satisfies more than one capability requirement
- b. When the capability solution eliminates or mitigates more than one associated capability gap
- c. For a Systems of Systems (SoS) when a set of systems are integrated to deliver a unique capability solution.
- d. In a Family of Systems (FoS) where similar capabilities are provided through different approaches.

**My Notes:**

**KC 4.3.** Under what circumstances can a CDD be generated without an associated ICD?

- a. When the CBA study team recommends proceeding direct to a CDD.
- b. When the Sponsor approves an ICD waiver
- c. When the AoA report indicates there is no need for an ICD.
- d. When the Joint Staff Gatekeeper, in coordination with the validation authority and the Milestone Decision Authority approves an ICD waiver.

**My Notes:**

## Section 4, Program Summary

**Section 4, Program Summary.** The purpose of this CDD section is to outline the overall approach for developing capability solutions to satisfy validated capability requirements and associated capability gaps and to identify related interdependencies that must be satisfied.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 5 (KC 5)

**KC 5.1.** The Program Summary must include an overall strategy for reaching?

- a. Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
- b. Full Operational Capability (FOC)
- c. Early Operational Assessments (EOAs)
- d. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E)

**My Notes:**

**KC 5.2.** Which of the following must be addressed in the Program Summary Section? Select all that apply:

- a. Whether the system being designed plans to use a Modular Open System Approach (MOSA).
- b. Total quantities, including training, spares, scheduled repair, and anticipated attrition over the lifecycle.
- c. Target date for IOC and FOC attainment
- d. Critical dependencies, and those with known risks or other issues.

**My Notes:**



**ANALYSIS CHECK 3 (AC 3)**

**AC 3.** While your draft CDD references both IOC and FOC, to include the dates for IOC and FOC, and the assets required for IOC and FOC, important details on required quantities are not included. Please explain what the draft has excluded and will need to be corrected.

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

## Section 5, Performance Attributes

**Section 5, Performance Attributes. (KPPs, KSAs, or APAs).** This section of the CDD is to outline the performance attributes intended to satisfy the validated capability requirements and associated capability gaps.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 6 (KC 6)

**KC 6.1.** Your draft CDD indicates a Sustainment KPP is not required because DSMS “is a terminally destructive single shot munition.” Considering the purpose of the Sustainment KPP, its five attributes, are there any indications that this rationale may be insufficient?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

**KC 6.2.** Performance attributes reflect.

- a. Measures of Performance (MoP)
- b. Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)
- c. Both A and above
- d. Neither A nor B above

**My Notes:**

**KC 6.3.** The DAU acronym “SMART” helps to ensure that a performance attribute is well-written and complete. Fill in the blanks on what “SMART” stands for?

- S
- M
- A
- R
- T

**KC 6.4.** What is a “Joint Performance Requirement”? Define it.

**Definition:**

**My Notes:**



## ANALYSIS CHECK 4 (AC 4)

**AC 4.1.** Fill in the Required KPP Table below as depicted in the CDD.

Tier 1 to 3 JCAs	Key Performance Parameter	JPR (check box)	Threshold	Objective
	KPP 1.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	KPP 2	<input type="checkbox"/>		

**My Notes:**

**AC 4.2.** In the previous section you discussed the issue of multiple increments. If you have multiple increments in this document, how are you to handle performance attributes in this section?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

## Section 6, Other System Attributes

**Section 6, Other System Attributes.** This section of the CDD is to identify any other system attributes not directly quantified (as performance attributes) and traceable to operational performance, and not identified elsewhere in the document.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 7 (KC 7)

**KC 7.** Section 6 would be the right place to capture the potential for integrating the DSMS missile launcher on rail cars to promote movement and launch where rail systems exist.

- a. True
- b. False

**My Notes:**



### ANALYSIS CHECK 5 (AC 5)

**AC 5.** Section 6 of the CDD does not comment on the transportability of the solution. Is this a problem? If so, how would you propose to correct it? HINT: Remember that the MDA chose Option #2 which was a DSMS missile system that is fully compatible with current HIMRS and MLRS missile launchers and therefore has the basic form factor similar to the current ATACMS missile. How can you use that information to inform your response?

**Explain:**



**My Notes:**

## Section 7, Interoperability

**Section 7, Interoperability.** This section of the CDD is to specify how the individual system will interoperate within the joint environment including any physical or net- ready interoperability effects on joint operations or operations with allies and partners.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 8 (KC 8)

**KC 8.1.** What are the Interoperability considerations required to be addressed if applicable to the solution described in a CDD? Select all that apply.

- a. Modular Open Systems Approach
- b. Intelligence Interoperability
- c. Joint Combat Interoperability
- d. Physical Interoperability
- e. Net-Ready Interoperability
- f. Joint Training Technical Interoperability

**My Notes:**

**KC 8.2.** If the Net-Ready performance attribute is applicable to your solution, in which section of the CDD is a Net-Ready Performance Summary Table required?

- a. Section 3
- b. Section 4
- c. Section 5
- d. Section 6
- e. Section 7
- f. None of the above

**My Notes:**



**GUT CHECK (GC 1)**

**GC 1.1.** Section 7 of your draft CDD does not discuss “physical interoperability”. Should there be any physical interoperability issues or concerns that the CDD should address?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

**GC 1.2.** The draft CDD lists 5 reasons to justify that the Net-Ready performance attribute is not applicable to DSMS. Was it necessary to justify why Net- Ready is not applicable?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

## **Section 8, Spectrum and Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Control Requirements**

**Section 8, Spectrum and Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Control Requirements.** This section identifies electromagnetic (EM) spectrum and electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) control requirements, to ensure compliance with policy and guidance. This information supports compliance with System Survivability KPP and Force Protection KPP and the Interoperable Attribute.



### **GUT CHECK (GC 2)**

**GC 2.** Does just stating that the solution must comply with all Spectrum and Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Control Requirements meet the JCIDS Manual requirements for Section 8 of the CDD?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

## Section 9, Intelligence Supportability

**Section 9, Intelligence Supportability.** This Section identifies intelligence support requirements and to ensure compliance with appropriate IC policy and guidance. This information also informs the intelligence review and certification conducted during staffing of the CDD.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 9 (KC 9)

**KC 9.** The draft CDD notes that the DSMS missile has no additional intelligence supportability requirements beyond what is required for the HIMARS and MLRS launch platforms. Which of the following are intelligence support categories? Select all that apply:

- a. Intelligence Threat Support
- b. Intelligence Resources Support
- c. Intelligence Interoperability Support
- d. Targeting Intelligence Support
- e. Intelligence Joint Mission Support
- f. Space Intelligence Support
- g. Counterintelligence and Security Support
- h. Intelligence Mission Data Support

**My Notes:**

## Section 10, Weapon Safety Assurance

**Section 10, Weapon Safety Assurance.** This section of the CDD is to ensure compliance with appropriate weapon safety policy and guidance, and when appropriate, to document tailoring of weapon safety requirements driven by unique aspects of the operational context. This information also informs the weapon safety review and endorsement conducted during staffing of the CDD.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 10 (KC 10)

**KC 10.1.** All munitions capable of being used, packaged, handled, stored, or transported by any Service in joint warfighting environments are considered to be joint weapons and require a joint weapons safety review and Weapon Safety Endorsement.

- a. True
- b. False

#### My Notes:

**KC 10.2.** Baseline Weapon Safety Requirements include: Select all that apply.

- a. System Safety
- b. Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management
- c. Protections for Warfighter Brain Health
- d. Insensitive Munitions.
- e. Fuze Safety
- f. Software System Safety
- g. Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- h. Laser Safety
- i. E3 Ordnance Safety
- j. Weapon Packing, Handling, Storage, and Transportation

**My Notes:**

## Section 11, Technology Readiness

**Section 11, Technology Readiness.** This section of the CDD is to highlight known technological challenges which may impact the ability to reach the level of performance identified in the performance attributes (KPPs, KSAs, or APAs), or represent risk to delivering capabilities on schedule and within budget.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 11 (KC 11)

**KC 11.1.** What are “critical technologies” and who determines them?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**

**KC 11.2.** Your CDD Section 11 must address: Select all that apply.

- a. For the CDD prior to Milestone B identify technological risk areas that require attention during the EMD phase of acquisition.
- b. For each Critical Technology Element (CTE) with a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of less than TRL-6, discuss potential workarounds to achieve partial or complete program success in the event that the technology does not mature as anticipated.
- c. What incremental acquisition strategies and/or MOSA are being used to enable flexibility in critical technology areas.
- d. Exportability “Allied/Partner Interoperability and Coalition Use” as per the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy.

**My Notes:**

## Section 12, DOTmLPF-P Considerations

**Section 12, DOTmLPF-P Considerations.** Unlike DOTmLPF-P gap-mitigation concerns in the ICD, this section of the CDD outlines those DOTmLPF-P changes needed to successfully implement the materiel capability solution.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 12 (KC 12)

**KC 12.1.** One of the important non-materiel considerations is Training. How would you consider Training in your CDD?

**Explain**

**My Notes:**

**KC 12.2.** Define the following DOTmLPF-P perspectives:

Enabling:

Integrating:

**My Notes:**

**KC 12.3.** Why is the “materiel” element in DOTmLPF-P referred to as “Little m”?

**Explain:**

**My Notes:**



## Section 13, Program Affordability

**Section 13, Program Affordability.** This section of the CDD identified the associated with pursuing the capability solution, including materiel and non-materiel costs over its projected lifecycle, and to ensure those resources are planned to be available for execution of the program.



### KNOWLEDGE CHECK 13 (KC 13)

**KC 13.1.** According to the JCIDS Manual, which of the following are required for program cost? Select all that apply.

- a. Cost caps from the acquisition program baseline for unit production and sustainment.
- b. Cite for Life cycle cost analysis conducted IAW DoDI 5000.73, Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures..
- c. A 30-year “sand chart” within the CDD or supplemental data uploaded to KM/DS.
- d. Identification of legacy capabilities which will be reduced in scope or eliminated to fund the new capability.

**My Notes:**

**KC 13.2.** For Part 13 you will need to complete Figure B-9, Summary of Required Resources. Figure B-9 includes Acquisition Required Resources and Warfighter Required Resources for System Operations and Support. Where does this data come from? Select all that apply.

- a. Acquisition Required Resources should be provided by your Component HQ programmers.
- b. The Combatant Commands should provide Warfighter Required Resources.
- c. Both Acquisition and Warfighter required resources should be provided by the PM.
- d. A 30 year “sand chart” to show program funding over time should be provided by your Component HQ programmers.

**My Notes:**

## ANALYSIS CHECKS - SCENARIO BASED

The following two analysis checks are based on scenarios that require you to engage some critical thinking about what you have learned. Read the scenario carefully before you proceed.



### ANALYSIS CHECK 6 (AC 6)

**AC 6. Scenario:** You are a member of your Service Headquarters' office that oversees JCIDS documents and interfaces with the Joint Staff on staffing and validation issues. A CDD for the Deep Strike Missile Capability does not contain a Force Protection KPP because the missile does not impact the launcher's demonstrated capability to ensure appropriate protection of the launch crew. The CDD does contain System Survivability KPPs even though the missiles will be launched from fielded launchers. Primary concerns include both cyber survivability and Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) survivability due to new missile hardware and software components that must interface with the fielded launch system to receive and program target data. Further, the missile must operate during and after exposure to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments, to include electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) effects. Prior to submitting the CDD to the Joint Staff Gatekeeper the CDD was submitted to your Service staff for comment. One senior staffer (an SES) insisted that since the missile system is designated "CBRN Mission Critical" rationale for this designation must be stated in the CDD, and all CBRN survivability attributes must be identified and addressed under Other System Attributes in the CDD. What is the appropriate action?

- a. Include a brief rationale justifying the CBRN Mission Critical designation in the CDD.
- b. Consider all relevant CBRN environments, as well as operational and maintenance requirements ensuring hardness against each environment.
- c. Include CBRN survivability attributes in the Other Attributes section of the CDD.
- d. Include CBRN survivability attributes as additional System Survivability KPPs in the CDD.
- e. Include CBRN survivability attributes as KSAs or APAs within the Survivability KPP in the CDD.

**My Notes:**



### ANALYSIS CHECK 7 (AC 7)

**AC 7. Scenario.** Your Deep Strike Missile System CDD was submitted to the Joint Staff Gatekeeper for review. Your recommended Joint Staffing Designator was “Joint Information” because there were no joint equities involved. The Gatekeeper disagreed and designated the CDD as “JROC Interest” due to the range and lethality KPPs that also apply to missiles fielded to another military Service and were considered Joint Performance Requirements. During KM/DS staffing two critical comments were submitted from a general officer at one of the Combatant Commands indicating that there must be a Force Protection KPP considering the potential vulnerability of the launch crew, and that one of the System Survivability performance attributes must be designated a KPP, not a KSA. As the sponsor, you disagree with both. What is the appropriate action?

- a. The Protection FCB should reach out to you, the Sponsor, for clarification and coordination.
- b. The Protection FCB should endorse or reject the comment.
- c. Submit your rationale for disagreement to the Protection FCB.
- d. As the Sponsor, decide whether to accept or reject either of the critical comments.

#### My Notes:

### Your Next Step

**Have you checked your answers to the questions? If not, recommend you do so now; use the references on the next page.**

By completing both Modules 1 and 2 Workbooks, you’ve now prepared yourself to take the RQM 2100 end-of-course exam. Save all your work in this Workbook, update your [RQM 2100 Course Survey](#). Then, when you're ready, log back into Cornerstone on Demand (CSOD) and launch your exam. Best of luck!

## References

Use the following references and helpful hints to check your answers to the knowledge, analysis and gut checks (KC, AC and GC). They are listed in the order in which they appear in the Workbook.

**KC 1.1.** How many sections and appendices are there in the body of a CDD?

*Reference: JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, sections 2.5 and 2.6.*

**KC 1.2.** What is the maximum page length of the body of a CDD?

*Reference: JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.*

**KC 2.1.** If your CDD was not supported by a validated ICD, what action should you take?

*Reference: JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.1.4.*

**KC 2.2.** If any changes to the operational context have been made since the ICD was validated, what action should you take? Select all that apply:

*Reference: JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.1.3.*

**AC 1.1.** You learned during your assessment of Workbook 1 that Section 1, Operational Context, of the ICD was missing a topic that should be considered. What was that topic, and does it also apply to Section 1 of your CDD?

*Reference: JCIDS Manual, Appendix A to Enclosure B, section 2.5.2.3 and Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.1.*

**AC 1.2.** Refer to the DSMS OV-1 in the CDD. Focus on the threshold and objective values for range called for in the OV-1. Are those in alignment with the range gap as called for in the ICD?

*References: JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.1.1.2. Draft CDD, Figure 1-1. Draft ICD, section 1.4.*

**AC 2.** Carefully review the Threat Assessment Extract. Is Section 2 of your CDD in sync with the System Survivability KPP?

*References: JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.2.3; Annex C to Appendix G to Enclosure B, Sections 1.3.1, 2.5.1.1, and 2.5.1.5. Draft CDD, section 5.1.*

**KC 3.1.** Operating in a non-lethal environment eliminates the need for using the most current Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise (DIAAE) threat products.

*Reference: JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.2.1.*

**KC 3.2.** What are the threat capabilities changes to which could critically impact the effectiveness and survivability of the DSMS, and who establishes them?

*Reference: JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.2.3.1.3.*

**KC 4.1.** Below is a CDD CR to Performance Attribute Traceability table template that follows the JCIDS Manual. This table is required in Section 3, Capability Discussion, of your CDD. The table depicts the contribution of your CDD to the fulfillment of capability requirements and closing of capability gaps described in the Deep Strike Mission Capability ICD. However, this

table was left out of your draft CDD. Using this template that follows the format in the JCIDS Manual, fill- in the missing data.

**References:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.3.2.1. Deep Strike Mission Capability - Army ICD.*

**Hint.** *Consider that Capability Requirement 1.1 should be Range expressed in kilometers. The Initial Objective Value should be 500km. Is this a “task, condition, standard?” The Source ICD for Capability Requirement 1.1 is the Deep Strike Mission Capability - Army ICD. What are the performance attributes for the CDD contribution column?*

**KC 4.2.** The Capability Gap and Overlap table provided for question KC 4.1 includes the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in Littorals ICD as a source. When is the use of more than one source ICD for a CDD permitted? Select all that apply.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix A to Enclosure A, section 2.2.3.2.*

**KC 4.3.** Under what circumstances can a CDD be generated without an associated ICD?

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix A to Enclosure A, Section 2.2.1.1.*

**KC 5.1.** The Program Summary must include an overall strategy for reaching?

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.4.2.*

**KC 5.2.** Which of the following must be addressed in the Program Summary Section? Select all that apply:

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.4.*

**AC 3.** While your draft CDD references both IOC and FOC, to include the dates for IOC and FOC, and the assets required for IOC and FOC, important details on required quantities are not included. Please explain what the draft has excluded and will need to be corrected.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.4.4.*

**KC 6.1.** Your draft CDD indicates a Sustainment KPP is not required because DSMS “is a terminally destructive single shot munition.” Considering the purpose of the Sustainment KPP, its five attributes, are there any indications that this rationale may be insufficient?

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.5.6.*

**Hint.** *The implication is that SS applies to the launchers and not the DSMS itself. This will be a “hard sell” during review by the Force Protection FCB. For example, DSMS may be threatened by the kinetic threats applicable to the launcher and also to non-kinetic threats including cyber and EMS. The guidance section of the DSMS obviously includes electronics.*

**KC 6.2.** Performance attributes reflect.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.5.3.1.*

**KC 6.3.** The DAU acronym “SMART” helps to ensure that a performance attribute is well-written and complete. Fill in the blanks on what “SMART” stands for?

**Reference:** *CDD JST, Section 5.*

**KC 6.4.** What is a “Joint Performance Requirement”? Define it.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Figure 1, and Glossary page GL-20.*

**Reference:** **JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.5.11.**

**AC 4.1.** Fill in the Required KPP Table below as depicted in the CDD.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.5.7, and Table B-8.*

**AC 4.2. If you have multiple increments in this document, how are you to handle performance attributes in this section?**

**Reference:** **JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.5.2.2, and CDD JST section 5.**

**KC 7.** Section 6 would be the right place to capture the potential for integrating the DSMS missile launcher on rail cars to promote movement and launch where rail systems exist.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.6.2.1*

**AC 5.** Section 6 of the draft CDD does not comment on transportability. Is this a problem? If so, how would you propose to correct it?

**References:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.6.2.6, and CBA Report Extract section 4.7.1.1.*

**Hint:** *Remember that the MDA chose Option #2 which was a DSMS missile system that is fully compatible with current HIMRS and MLRS missile launchers and therefore has the basic form factor similar to the current ATACMS missile. How can you use that information to inform your response?*

**KC 8.1.** What are the Interoperability considerations required to be addressed if applicable to the solution described in a CDD? Select all that apply.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, sections 2.5.7.1, 2.5.7.2, 2.5.7.3, 2.5.7.4 and 2.5.7.5,*

**KC 8.2.** If the Net-Ready performance attribute is applicable to your solution, in which section of the CDD is a Net-Ready Performance Summary Table required?

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.7.4.*

**GC 1.1.** Section 7 of your draft CDD does not discuss “physical interoperability”. Should there be any physical interoperability issues or concerns that the CDD should address?

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.7.3.*

**Hint:** *Is there some impact on the MLRS or HIMARS launchers that would change the current physical interoperability aspects of these launchers, or do the DSMS containers have some unique physical aspects? If not, there is no need to address physical interoperability in your CDD.*

**GC 1.2.** The draft CDD lists 5 reasons to justify that the Net-Ready performance attribute is not applicable to DSMS. Was it necessary to justify why Net- Ready is not applicable?

**Reference:** *CDD JST Section 5 and JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.7.4, Appendix G to Enclosure B, Section 4.2.1, and Annex A to Appendix G to Enclosure B, section 3.5.2.1.*

**GC 2.** Does just stating that the solution must comply with all Spectrum and Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Control Requirements meet the JCIDS Manual requirements for Section 8 of the CDD?

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.8.*

**KC 9.** The draft CDD notes that the DSMS missile has no additional intelligence supportability requirements beyond what is required for the HIMARS and MLRS launch platforms. Which of the following are intelligence support categories? Select all that apply:

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Annex G to Appendix G to Enclosure B, section 3.3.2.*

**KC 10.1.** All munitions capable of being used, packaged, handled, stored, or transported by any Service in joint warfighting environments are considered to be joint weapons and require a joint weapons safety review and Weapon Safety Endorsement.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.10.2.*

**KC 10.2.** Baseline Weapon Safety Requirements include (select all that apply)

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Annex H to Appendix G to Enclosure B, section 2.3.*

**KC 11.1.** What are “critical technologies” and who determines them?

**Reference:** *CDD JST Section 11.*

**KC 11.2.** Your CDD Section 11 must address: Select all that apply.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.11.*

**KC 12.1.** One of the important non-materiel considerations is Training. How would you consider Training in your CDD? Explain your answer in the context of the guidance described for part 12 of the CDD.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.12.5.3.*

**Hint:** *Read the reference carefully. Training includes “practices” and/or training systems.*

**KC 12.2.** Define the following DOTmLPF-P perspectives: Enabling and Integrating

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.12.4.*

**KC 12.3.** Why is the “materiel” element in DOTmLPF-P referred to as “Little m”?

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix F to Appendix G to Enclosure B, section 2.5.1..*

**KC 13.1.** According to the JCIDS Manual, which of the following are required for program cost? Select all that apply.

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.13.*

**KC 13.2.** For Part 13 of your CDD you will need to complete Figure B-9, Summary of Required Resources. Figure B-9 includes Acquisition Required Resources and Warfighter Required Resources for System Operations and Support. Where does this data come from? Select all that apply.

**Reference:** *CDD JST section 13.*

**AC 6. Scenario:** You are a member of your Service Headquarters' office that oversees JCIDS documents and interfaces with the Joint Staff on staffing and validation issues. A CDD for the Deep Strike Missile Capability does not contain a Force Protection KPP because the missile does not impact the launcher's demonstrated capability to ensure appropriate protection of the launch crew. The CDD does contain System Survivability KPPs even though the missiles will be launched from fielded launchers. Primary concerns include both cyber survivability and Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) survivability due to new missile hardware and software components that must interface with the fielded launch system to receive and program target data. Further, the missile must operate during and after exposure to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments, to include electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) effects. Prior to submitting the CDD to the Joint Staff Gatekeeper the CDD was submitted to your Service staff for comment. One senior staffer (an SES) insisted that since the missile system is designated "CBRN Mission Critical" rationale for this designation must be stated in the CDD, and all CBRN survivability attributes must be identified and addressed under Other System Attributes in the CDD. What is/are the appropriate action(s)?

**Reference:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix C to Enclosure B, section 2.5.1.1.*

**AC 7. Scenario.** Your Deep Strike Missile System CDD was submitted to the Joint Staff Gatekeeper for review. Your recommended Joint Staffing Designator was "Joint Information" because there were no joint equities involved. The Gatekeeper disagreed and designated the CDD as "JROC Interest" due to the range and lethality KPPs that also apply to missiles fielded to another military Service and both range and lethality KPPs were considered Joint Performance Requirements. During KM/DS staffing two critical comments were submitted from a general officer at one of the Combatant Commands indicating that there must be a Force Protection KPP considering the potential vulnerability of the launch crew, and that the EMS System Survivability attributes must be designated KPPs, not KSAs. As the sponsor, you disagree with both. What is the appropriate action(s)?

**References:** *JCIDS Manual, Appendix A to Enclosure A, section 3.2.3.4.3; Annex C to Appendix G to Enclosure B, section 2.5.1.5.1.1.*