|DoD IA&E Laws, Regulations and Policies List -- UPDATE||https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/Lists/Blog/DispForm.aspx?ID=85||DoD IA&E Laws, Regulations and Policies List -- UPDATE||2021-07-15T16:00:00Z||https://wwwad.dauext.dau.mil/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/DAU Images/DAU_Locations Headquarters_20170104.jpg, https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/DAU Images/DAU_Locations Headquarters_20170104.jpg
https://wwwad.dauext.dau.mil/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/DAU Images/DAU_Locations Headquarters_20170104.jpg||<div class="ExternalClass0B1D2DE1118747659B0079B814481793">The DAU Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) - International Center periodically publishes a list of key <strong><a href="/cop/iam/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/IAE%20Laws%20Regs%20Policies%20Reference%20List%20w-links.docx?Web=1">International Acquisition and Exportability (IA&E) Laws, Regulations, and Policies</a></strong> reference documents that pertain to the IA&E aspects of the DoD acquisition enterprise.<br>
Our July 2021 list update includes a full range of Title 10 and Title 22, U.S. Code statutes, Federal Regulations, and DoD and JCS directives, instructions, manuals, and guidebooks, including relevant DoD 5000 series Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF) policy directives and instructions issued over the past few years.<br>
This list is designed to provide the U.S. Government/DoD workforce and supporting industry with easy access to the primary sources that govern the structure, organization, planning, and implementation of DoD IA&E activities throughout the acquisition lifecycle. IA&E efforts are often complex and challenging. We encourage DoD acquisition workforce "generalists" and DoD International Acquisition Career Path (IACP) and Security Cooperation workforce members in government and industry to consult these primary sources when ambiguities arise. Remember to seek advice from DoD Component International Programs Organization (IPO) subject matter experts on how to assess and interpret relevant documents when IA&E critical thinking on tough problems is required.<br>
Until next time,<br>
|DAU ACQ 380V International Acquisition Management Course||https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/Lists/Blog/DispForm.aspx?ID=84||DAU ACQ 380V International Acquisition Management Course||2021-07-08T16:00:00Z||https://wwwad.dauext.dau.mil/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/Special Interest Areas/DAU_International Acquisition UN_20170104.jpg, https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/Special Interest Areas/DAU_International Acquisition UN_20170104.jpg
https://wwwad.dauext.dau.mil/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/Special Interest Areas/DAU_International Acquisition UN_20170104.jpg||<div class="ExternalClassF84AECE5E1604D8B87287039C1DE9ABF">Defense Acquisition University's <a href="https://icatalog.dau.edu/onlinecatalog/courses.aspx?crs_id=12489"><strong>ACQ 380V International Acquisition Management</strong></a> course has "virtual seats" available on August 24-31, 2021.<br>
This Virtual Instructor Led course is designed for senior managers in DoD International Program Organizations (IPOs), Program Management Offices (PMOs), Integrated Product Teams), Research & Development Warfare Centers, and Science & Technology laboratories who are responsible for planning, organizing, and leading International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E) efforts in the following functional areas:
<li><strong>IA&E Planning and Analysis</strong> on existing and new start DoD acquisition projects/programs</li>
<li><strong>International Cooperative Program (ICP) </strong>identification, validation, negotiation, and implementation</li>
<li><strong>Foreign Military Sales (FMS) </strong>and other Defense Sales business planning, engagement, transactions, and program implementation</li>
<li><strong>Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) </strong>system engagement and navigation</li>
<li><strong>Defense Exportability Integration (DEI)</strong> design and development</li>
<li><strong>International Contracting</strong> transaction policies and practices</li>
DAU's <strong><a href="https://icatalog.dau.edu/onlinecatalog/courses.aspx?crs_id=12391">ACQ 230V International Acquisition Integration</a></strong> course is a prerequisite. The next two ACQ 230V offerings are scheduled for July 26-July 29 and August 16-19, 2021.<br>
All DoD Acquisition Workforce (all career fields), DoD Security Cooperation Workforce members, DoD support contractors, and defense industry employees are welcome! Register today for ACQ 380V through the <strong><a href="https://icatalog.dau.edu/onlinecatalog/courses.aspx?crs_id=12489">DAU iCatalog</a></strong>.</div>||string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/DAU-ACQ-380V-International-Acquisition-Management-Course|
|The International Acquisition & Exportability Aspects of JSF – Concept Demonstration Phase||https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/Lists/Blog/DispForm.aspx?ID=83||The International Acquisition & Exportability Aspects of JSF – Concept Demonstration Phase||2021-06-26T16:00:00Z||https://wwwad.dauext.dau.mil/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/JSF Intl.jpg, https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/JSF Intl.jpg
https://wwwad.dauext.dau.mil/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/JSF Intl.jpg||<div class="ExternalClass5C52D22742E44131809331D81559018C">My first blog on this topic focused on the initial formation of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program beginning in the late 1980s. This rest of this blog series will explore the F-35’s IA&E history, accomplishments, and overall impact on U.S. national security. This blog addresses the International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E) aspects of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Concept Demonstration Phase (CDP).
My initial blog noted that -- unlike most DoD acquisition programs -- JSF’s original vision emphasized IA&E:
<div style="text-align:center;"><strong><em>Be the Model Acquisition Program for Joint Service and <u>International Cooperation</u></em></strong><br>
<strong><em>Develop and Produce an Affordable Next Generation Strike Fighter Weapon System </em></strong><strong><em>and Sustain it Worldwide</em></strong></div>
DoD senior leaders decided JSF should be an international program from its inception to achieve the following national security and defense policy goals:
<li><strong><em>Building Political-Military Relationships</em></strong></li>
<li><strong><em>Conducting Coalition Operations</em></strong></li>
<li><strong><em>Promoting Economic Burden Sharing</em></strong></li>
<li><strong><em>Achieving Industrial Benefits</em></strong></li>
<li><strong>Expanding Global Technology Sharing</strong></li>
The next challenge faced by the Air Force, Navy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) … how to achieve these objectives at the program level.
<h2><strong>JAST IA&E Analysis</strong></h2>
In January 1994, DoD formally established the Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program Office (JAST PO) – the precursor to the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office (JSF PO) -- in order to move forward with the program’s initial development activity, the Concept Demonstration Phase (CDP). However, the formative stages of the JAST PO actually began in the early 1990s. During this time period, the senior leaders in Air Force Acquisition (AQ) and DARPA established a relationship with the Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO) and Air Force international experts. They began conducting informal international engagement activities with allied and friendly countries to inform them about DoD’s progress in forming a new strike fighter acquisition program.<br>
In 1993, the prospective JAST Program Director (RADM Craig Steidle) created an International Affairs group to forge partnerships with the Office of SecDef/Acquisition, Technology & Logistics/International Cooperation office (AT&L/IC) and Navy/Air Force international programs organizations. This new JAST IA&E team’s first task was to conduct an IA&E Analysis focused on identifying potential international cooperative opportunities with partner nations as an integral part of JAST’s initial CDP activities.<br>
The JAST IA&E team received top down guidance from Deputy SecDef John Deutch, Under SecDef (Acquisition & Technology) Paul Kaminski, and Air Force and Navy Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) during this time period that the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) was very interested in becoming a JAST CDP phase partner. The senior leaders also asked this team to engage other prospective CDP phase partner nations to encourage them to join. DoD had been authorized by U.S. Government (USG) laws enacted in the 1980s to form partnerships with allied and friendly nations through International Cooperative Program International Agreements (ICP IAs).<br>
Prior to 1990, large-scale U.S. and European cooperative acquisition programs were formed based on a "traditional" ICP IA structure used by the Europeans that involved all partner nations:
<li><em><strong>Signing</strong></em> a multilateral at the same time to initiate the cooperative program.</li>
<li><em><strong>Contributing</strong></em> their “fair share” of the program’s cost on either an equal or mutually agreed proportional basis.</li>
<li><em><strong>Establishing</strong></em> some type of Steering Committee (SC) and Joint Program Office (JPO) responsible for managing the program on an equal or proportional basis.</li>
<li><em><strong>Awarding</strong></em> contracts for program work proportional to each participant’s cost share (referred to as “juste retour”), ensure that the advanced technology contracting efforts (referred to as “noble work”) was also proportionally shared.</li>
The JAST IA&E team quickly realized that this "traditional" ICP IA structure would never work on DoD-led JAST program involving advanced U.S. technology, predominantly funded by the U.S., and run by a U.S. program office on DoD’s desired timeline. A new kind of ICP IA strategy would be needed for JAST CDP cooperation. They conducted an <strong><a href="/cop/iam/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/DAU%20-%20Pre-JAST%20IA_E%20Assessment%20R-%206-19-21.pdf?Web=1">IA&E Analysis</a> </strong>to develop and evaluate potential courses of action regarding the formation of ICP partnerships with allied and friendly nations.
<h2><strong>JAST ICP Strategy</strong></h2>
The key factors that drove the formulation of the overall JAST ICP strategy in the 1993-1994 timeframe were:
<li><em><strong>DoD and UK MoD senior leader tentative agreement</strong></em> on a U.S. – 90%; UK 10% CDP partnership cost share arrangement.</li>
<li><em><strong>DoD willingness to accept that</strong></em>, based on this level of UK investment in the program, that <strong>t</strong><em><strong><strong>he</strong> UK MoD should “have a say’</strong></em> in the JAST Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant requirements and STOVL-related CDP program management decision making.</li>
<li><em><strong>DoD and UK MoD desire to form a JAST ICP partnership </strong></em>before the JAST CDP Request for Proposal (RFP) was released in order to legally permit UK MoD personnel to participate in JAST PO CDP phase program management and contract source selection activities.</li>
<li><em><strong>USG/DoD recognition that new Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) policy guidance</strong></em> would have to be established to permit a ‘reasonable’ level of JAST capability and technology sharing at both the government and industry level with ‘trustworthy’ allied and friendly nations.</li>
<li><em><strong>UK MoD and other partner nation willingness to accept a U.S. “best value” approach</strong></em>, rather than European “juste retour” industrial participation work sharing arrangements.</li>
<li><em><strong>U.S industry CDP prime contractor willingness to team with foreign industry</strong></em> as partners, subcontractors, and suppliers.</li>
<h2><strong>JAST ICP IA Approach</strong></h2>
DoD and UK MoD senior leaders – and their industry counterparts – authorized key staff to begin detailed exploratory discussions at the program office level on a potential U.S.-UK JAST CDP phase cooperative partnerships in 1994. After initial exploratory discussion sessions with their UK MoD counterparts, the DoD and UK MoD program office teams areed that there was sufficient convergence on the key aspects listed above to proceed into formal U.S.-UK ICP IA negotiations.<br>
In parallel, with this activity, the JAST IA&E team also began conducting exploratory discussions with other potential allied and friendly nations who had expressed senior level interest in JAST CDP participation. However, they quickly realized that the U.S.-UK CDP partnership would be the top priority, and that the U.S.-UK ICP IA would have to be bilateral (rather than multilateral) to achieve each nation’s desired CDP objectives.<br>
This led the JAST IA&E team to devise a two-tier ICP IA negotiation concept during this timeframe – which they internally nicknamed the “peperoni pizza” approach – which involved:
<li><em><strong>A U.S. DoD – UK MoD bilateral ICP IA</strong></em> that established a 90/10 cooperative U.S.-UK partnership on all CDP objectives and scope of work (i.e., U.S.-UK cooperation on the entire “pizza”).</li>
<li><em><strong>Development of potential opportunities for other prospective allied/friendly nations to join the U.S</strong></em>. (without the UK) on specific, limited scope JAST CDP cooperative projects at a minimum $10M investment level per nation (i.e., partnerships on various “peperoni slices” of cooperative activity).</li>
The JAST IA&E team discussed this approach with their UK MoD counterparts. Both sides decided that a U.S.-UK JAST Framework Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and CDP Project Agreement (PA) would be negotiated and established as the first JAST CDP cooperative partnership with the broadest scope of work. They agreed that the MOU and PA provisions would be structured to allow the U.S. to unilaterally establish separate, smaller scope JAST CDP IAs with other prospective partner nations in the future after consulting with the UK MoD.<br>
This JAST ICP IA “peperoni pizza" approach allowed the JAST IA negotiation team to successfully complete U.S.-U.K. JAST Framework MOU and CDP PA negotiations on time. USD(A&T) Paul Kaminski and UK Chief of Defence Procurement M. K. McIntosh signed both MOU and PA in December 1995, just prior to the JAST PO’s release of the initial Request for Proposal to initiate the CDP contract competition in December 1995.
<h2><strong>U.S.-UK JAST CDP Cooperation</strong></h2>
The MOU and PA established a JAST MOU Executive Committee (EC) to ensure an appropriate level of UK MoD involvement in JAST cooperative program oversight. The JAST Program Director (PD) was “double hatted” as the PD for the JAST cooperative program. The PA established the JAST Program Office (PO) as the organization responsible for management of JAST CDP cooperative program efforts defined in the PA’s Objectives and Scope of Work sections. The PA also authorized up to four UK MoD Cooperative Program Personnel (CPPs) to report to the JAST PD and work in the JAST PO in acquisition management positions mutually agreed by the JAST EC.<br>
The PA’s financial section required DoD to contribute $1.8B and UK MoD to contribute $.2B MoD to cooperatively fund the JAST CDP effort ($2B total PA value). The PA assigned DoD responsibility for all CDP contracting, including UK MoD CPP insight and limited participation in the process within the JAST PO. The PA’s Work Sharing section was based on a best value principle rather than the European “juste retour” approach. The Disclosure and Use section of the PA established proportional sharing of use rights with respect to contractor information developed and delivered under PA-related contracts cooperatively funded by DoD and UK MoD.<br>
In November 1996, DoD (with UK involvement) selected Lockheed Martin and Boeing as JAST CDP contractors. DoD awarded separate contracts to each company to develop prototypes for a competitive “fly off” at the end of the phase to determine which contractor would be awarded the follow-on Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase contract. Both Lockheed Martin and Boeing established international teaming arrangements with UK industry as part of their respective CDP prototype development efforts.
<h2><strong>Additional JAST CDP Partnerships</strong></h2>
Once the US-UK JAST Framework MOU and CDP PA were signed -- and the two JAST CDP contractors were selected -- the JAST IA&E team focused on engaging other potential CDP partners. The primary challenge they faced was defining small “peperoni slices” of specific CDP work, requiring only modest investment by other interested nations, that would be attractive enough to encourage them to join as CDP partners. USG/DoD TSFD policy and Lockheed Martin’s and Boeing’s willingness to engage in best value work sharing arrangements with partner nation industry were also important considerations.
<h3><strong><em>Denmark, Netherlands and Norway (DNN)</em></strong></h3>
The first CDP partnership “peperoni slice” arrangement -- commonly referred to the “DNN” CDP Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) -- was negotiated multilaterally with the Ministries of Defense (MoDs) of these three nations. Along with Belgium, the DNN MoDs had been longstanding F-16 Multinational Fighter Program (MNFP) partners with DoD. However, Belgium decided not to participate in JSF CDP, so the DNN MoDs asked DoD if they could join in a multilateral CDP partnership on JAST Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) requirements validation tasks at an investment level of $10M each ($30M total). DoD contributed $30M of JAST CDP ‘in-kind’ effort already budgeted/funded and under contract with both CDP phase contractors ($60M total MOA value).<br>
The JSF IA&E team developed a proposed DNN CDP MOA based on a mutually agreed set of requirements validation objectives and scope of work tasks. The MOA also contained provisions similar to those used in the US-UK JAST CDP international agreements, including an Executive Committee, one CPP for each nation in the JAST PO, proportional sharing of JAST CDP phase government and contractor developed information, and best value work sharing arrangements. Both sides pushed hard to complete negotiations quickly to bring DNN onboard as early in the CDP phase effort as possible. All four nations signed the MOA, which entered into effect in June 1997, just eight months after DoD’s CDP contract awards to Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
The second CDP partnership “peperoni slice” arrangement was negotiated bilaterally with the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND). The Royal Canadian Air Force was interested in learning more about JAST as a potential replacement for its CF-18 aircraft. The Canadian DND’s objectives focused on participating in JAST CDP CTOL design refinement activities, technology leveraging, and exploring opportunities for Canadian industry participation in the program. The U.S. DoD – Canadian DND CDP MOU was proportionally cost shared, with DoD contributing $50M of JAST CDP ‘in-kind’ effort already budgeted/funded and under contract with both CDP phase contractors while DND contributed $10M ($60M total MOU value).<br>
MOU arrangements in other areas were substantially the same as the U.S.-DNN CDP MOA, including the establishment of an MOU EC and assignment of one Canadian DND CPP to the JAST PO. The MOU was signed by the U.S. DoD National Armaments Director, Dr. Jack Gansler, and his Canadian DND counterpart and entered into effect in January 1998.
The third and final CDP partnership “peperoni slice” arrangement was negotiated bilaterally with the Italian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Italian Navy’s air arm (<em>Aviazione Navale</em>) was interested in learning more about JAST as a potential replacement for its AV-8B Harrier II Plus aircraft. The Italian MoD’s objectives focused on JAST Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) ship integration risk mitigation tasks to enhance Italian and U.S. interoperability and exploring opportunities for Italian industry participation in the program. Scope of work tasks also included a CTOL/STOVL mixed force study. The U.S. DoD – Italian MoD CDP Agreement was cost shared equally, with DoD providing $10M worth of non-financial contributions of JAST CDP Project Information already budgeted/funded and under contract with both CDP phase contractors while DND contributed $10M in financial contributions to expand ongoing JAST CDP efforts in the MOU scope of work areas ($20M total MOU value).<br>
Agreement arrangements in other areas were substantially the same as the U.S.-DNN CDP MOA and U.S.-Canada CDP MOU, including the establishment of an Agreement EC and assignment of one Italian MoD CPP to the JAST PO. The Agreement was signed by the U.S. DoD National Armaments Director, Dr. Jack Gansler, and his Italian MOD counterpart and entered into effect in December 1998.
<h2><strong>JAST CDP Defense Exportability</strong></h2>
One of the least well-known areas regarding JAST CDP cooperative partnership arrangement is how it established a foundation for future JSF defense exportability. ICP partnerships like JSF, by their very nature, “build exportability” into a new system. Here’s why:
<li><em><strong>Building defense exportability</strong></em> into the system becomes a <em><strong>mandatory requirement</strong></em> that must be achieved as an integral part of DoD’s commitment to implement the ICP IA(s) that it has signed.</li>
<li><em><strong>Early USG/TSFD policy decisions</strong></em> must be sought and obtained by the DoD Component(s) that is/are responsible for the program. This ensures that the Program Office’s Systems Engineering efforts include: a) development of “one size fits all” program protection measures; and, b) employment of a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) design architecture that enables TSFD differential capability policy implementation for a wide range of allied and friendly nations.</li>
<li><em><strong>Early USG export control decisions</strong></em> for the program must be sought and obtained by U.S. industry – working with their partner industry teammates, subcontractors and suppliers – early on. The process used by U.S. industry to obtain USG export authorizations to implement ICP IA-related program contracts helps set the stage for future international industrial cooperation and technology sharing among partner nations.</li>
<li><em><strong>Partner nation contributions to the ICP IA increase the overall financial resources</strong></em> available to the Program Office to fund government and industry defense exportability efforts from the program’s inception onward.</li>
<li><em><strong>Partner nation CPPs</strong></em> – who become an integral part of the ICP IA Program Office staff – are available onsite to<em><strong> help inform, shape, and guide program efforts</strong></em> to achieve coalition interoperability. They also help identify – and hopefully resolve – the defense exportability capability and technology sharing “hard points” that arise as the program moves forward through development, production, and operations & sustainment phases.</li>
Defense exportability -- and the coalition interoperability it leads to when allies and friends eventually acquire ICP or U.S.-developed systems and equipment – is a “greater good” that everyone in the USG and DoD wants to achieve in DoD acquisition programs. However, does not come free. It requires funding, talent, and time to achieve. The best way to accomplish this is through ICPs. NATO SeaSparrow, the F-16 Multinational Fighter Program, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System -- and countless other cooperative programs -- have demonstrated this since the 60s. So does JSF.
<h2><strong>JAST CDP Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Activities</strong></h2>
One of the other innovative approaches used during JAST CDP was the establishment an initial set of FMS Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) with Singapore, Turkey, and Israel. The LOAs established bilaterally with these three allies and friends provided them with JSF CDP government and industry insight and information at a modest cost. These initial CDP FMS arrangements were expanded by Singapore and Israel during the JSF SDD phase, while Turkey decided to join the JSF SDD Phase multilateral partnership.
The network of <strong><a href="/cop/iam/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/JSF%20IA-E%20-%20CDP%20Overview%206-19-21.pdf?Web=1">JAST CDP ICP partnerships</a> </strong>with key allies brought $250M of additional early international investment into the program. The EC relationships in the four JAST CDP ICP IAs -- and the seven CPPs from the UK, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Canada, and Italy in the JAST PO -- contributed a wealth of acquisition and operational expertise throughout CDP. Lockheed Martin and Boeing were able to use early USG/DoD TSFD policy decisions to seek and obtain USG export approvals from State and Commerce to establish initial relationships with the partner nations’ industries in approved CDP technology sharing areas. As we shall see in my next blog on JSF System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase cooperation, JAST CDP efforts led to the development of JSF CTOL, STOVL and Carrier (CV) variants designed to meet the future needs of ICP partner and FMS customer allied and friendly nations.<br>
Until next time, Prof K</div>||string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/The-International-Acquisition-and-Exportability-(IAandE)-Aspects-of-JSF-–-Concept-Demonstration-Phase-|
|The International Acquisition & Exportability Aspects of JSF -- Beginnings||https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/Lists/Blog/DispForm.aspx?ID=82||The International Acquisition & Exportability Aspects of JSF -- Beginnings||2021-05-28T16:00:00Z||https://wwwad.dauext.dau.mil/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/JSF Intl.jpg, https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/JSF Intl.jpg
https://wwwad.dauext.dau.mil/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/PublishingImages/JSF Intl.jpg||<div class="ExternalClass7411EF83A58E469C938042C06235DCB7">As one of DoD's largest major acquisition programs, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has always attracted a lot of attention. It has been an immensely challenging and expensive undertaking in a key DoD capability area -- the development and fielding of U.S. high performance fighter aircraft – since the program was initially formed in the late 1980s.<br>
JSF has always had many vocal supporters and detractors. In recent months, there have been several articles critical of the program, including one in April 2021 entitled “<strong><a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/mar/28/f-35-threatened-pentagon-budget-crunch/">Budget Crunch Threatens Vaunted F-35: ‘Flawed Concept From The Very Beginning’</a></strong>.” The program has certainly encountered many problems over the years, and is still grappling with cost, schedule and performance issues today. However, I do not believe the JSF program's International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E) efforts have been flawed since the program’s inception. In fact, I would argue that this aspect of the program over the past thirty years has been very successful.<br>
This blog series will focus the F-35’s IA&E history, accomplishments, and overall impact on U.S. national security.
The JSF was initially conceived as a replacement for the <a href="https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/techdigest/pdf/V18-N01/18-01-Steidle.pdf"><strong>F-16, A-10, AV-8B, and F-18</strong> </a>in the late 1980s. DoD leadership decided to take steps to formally establish a Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Program in the early 1990s. Here’s the program’s original Vision Statement as briefed to the National Security Council in July 1992:<br>
<strong><em>Be the Model Acquisition Program for Joint Service and <u>International Cooperation</u> </em></strong><br>
<strong><em>Develop and Produce an Affordable Next Generation Strike Fighter Weapon System</em></strong><br>
<strong><em>and Sustain it Worldwide</em></strong><br>
One of the remarkable aspects of the JAST Vision Statement – both the early 1990s and today – is the emphasis on JSF being a model program for “International Cooperation.”<br>
At that time, DoD senior leaders within the SecDef, Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps consciously decided to develop and field <strong><a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/what-makes-5th-generation-fighter-jets-different-from-earlier-jets-2021-2">5<sup>th</sup> Generation fighter aircraft</a></strong> that our allies and friends would be able to acquire to replace the 4<sup>th</sup> Generation tactical aircraft they had bought (or were buying) from the U.S.
Why did these DoD senior leaders choose to emphasize International Cooperation on JAST/JSF in the late 1980s and early 1990s? Because they hoped to achieve the following outcomes:
<li><strong><em>Political-Military Relationships</em></strong>: U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps senior leaders realized that F-16, AV-8B, and F-18 sales and cooperative program activity had resulted in the formation and maturation of long-term military-to military relationships with key allies and friends around the globe. DoD senior leaders recognized the positive impact these mil-to-mil relationships had at the defense and foreign policy level and wanted to achieve similar results with JSF.</li>
<li><strong><em>Coalition Operations</em></strong>: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and regional Combatant/Component Commanders recognized the value of allied/friendly nation ownership of F-16s, AV-8Bs, and F-18s in training and combat operations prior to and during Desert Shield/Storm. They wanted the DoD replacement for these aircraft to be exportable and interoperable.</li>
<li><strong><em>Economic Burden Sharing</em></strong>: In the mid-1980s through the 1990s, <strong><a href="/library/arj/ARJ/arq99/pollock.pdf">Senator Sam Nunn</a></strong> and other key leaders in Congress and DoD widely promoted the establishment of International Cooperative Programs (ICPs) with allies and friends to share the non-recurring investment costs associated with developing, producing, fielding, and logistically supporting new systems like JSF.</li>
<li><strong><em>Industrial Benefits</em></strong>: Forward thinking DoD and industry leaders realized that 4<sup>th</sup> Generation F-16, AV-8B, and F-18 international sales would eventually wane, and that neither the 5<sup>th</sup> Generation F-117 nor the F-22 could be sold internationally since they weren’t designed to be exportable. The also recognized that a new, exportable 5<sup>th</sup> generation U.S. advanced tactical fighter would eventually be needed to effectively compete in global defense market in future years.</li>
<li><em><strong>Technology Sharing</strong></em>: While most people in the U.S. in late 1980s felt that our country had a substantial lead in defense technology, a few DoD and Congressional leaders advocated broader U.S. and allied/friendly nation technology sharing through ICPs. This included Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) technology relevant to the proposed JSF STOVL version that was intended to eventually replace the USMC’s AV-8B.</li>
<h3><strong>IMPLEMENTING THE VISION</strong></h3>
My next blog on this topic will focus on the initial activities pursued by DoD acquisition and security cooperation professionals in the early-to-mid 1990s to try to turn the JAST/JSF Vision Statement into a reality during the program’s Concept Demonstration Phase.<br>
Until next time, Prof K</div>||string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/The-International-Acquisition-and-Exportability-Aspects-of-JSF----Beginnings|